A common assumption in standard economic models is that agents are risk-averse and prudent, and it is often argued that prudence is necessary to generate precautionary savings. This paper shows that prudence is not necessary to generate precautionary savings in small open economy models with more than two periods. A new class of preferences, which enables the isolation of the effect of risk aversion on precautionary savings, is introduced. The effects of changes in risk aversion, interest rates, and persistence and volatility of shocks on average asset holdings are qualitatively identical to the ones observed for standard constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences. These results show that the almost universal assertion in the literature - that only prudent consumers can generate positive levels of precautionary savings - is simply incorrect.

This paper focuses on precautionary saving against uncertain longevity and on the annuity insurance aspects of social security within the life-cycle framework. The principal findings are three. First, the evolution of social security is reviewed in response to missing markets for providing insurance for consumption in the face of lifetime uncertainty. A simple life-cycle model is used to show that even an actuarially fair, fully funded social security system can reducenational saving. Second, to the extent that the introduction of social security reduces the size of accidental bequests, the net effect on the consumption of subsequent generations is diminished. Finally, consideration of the welfare gains from compulsory social security requires an examination of the tradeoff between the benefits to early participants from access to the annuities and the costs to generations that follow of a lower capital stock. Across a range of parameter values, the partial equilibrium impact of social security on consumptionis reversed. The introduction of an explicit bequest motive ivitigates both the initial impact of social security on saving and the long-run welfare loss from the introduction of social security

This paper re-examines precautionary saving with general Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences. The conditions existing in the literature are much more complex than in the Expected Utility framework. We obtain a simple and intuitive result on precautionary savings via disentangling time preference and risk preference effects.

I study the consumption-saving problem with non-separable utility under ambiguity. Using smooth ambiguity aversion, I show that the introduction of ambiguity and greater ambiguity aversion raise optimal saving. When relative prudence in ambiguity preferences is bounded by 2, also greater ambiguity increases saving. While previous work finds that a convex marginal ambiguity function is not sufficient for precautionary saving (Berger, 2014), I show that it may not even be necessary.

We estimate the fraction of the wealth of a sample of PSID respondents that is held because some households face greater income uncertainty than others. We first derive an equation characterizing the theoretical relationship between wealth and uncertainty in a buffer-stock model of saving. Next, we estimate that equation using PSID data; we find strong evidence that households engage in precautionary saving. Finally, we simulate the wealth distribution that would prevail if all households had the same uncertainty as the lowest-uncertainty group. We find that between 39 and 46 percent of wealth in our sample is attributable to uncertainty differentials across groups.

At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.