Countries throughout the world have passed regulations that promise protection for workers and the environment, but violations of these policies are more common than compliance. All too often, limitations of state capacity and political will intertwine, hindering enforcement. Why do states enforce regulations in some places, and in some industries, but not in others? In Politicized Enforcement in Argentina, Amengual develops a framework for analyzing enforcement in middle-income and developing countries, showing how informal linkages between state officials and groups within society allow officials to gain the operational resources and political support necessary for enforcement. This analysis builds on state-society approaches in comparative politics, but in contrast to theories that emphasize state autonomy, it focuses on key differences in the way states are porous to political influence.

Countries throughout the world have passed regulations that promise protection for workers and the environment, but violations of these policies are more common than compliance. All too often, limitations of state capacity and political will intertwine hindering enforcement. Why do states enforce regulations in some places, and in some industries, but not in others? In Politicized Enforcement in Argentina, Amengual develops a framework for analyzing enforcement in middle-income and developing countries, showing how informal linkages between state officials and groups within society allow officials to gain the operational resources and political support necessary for enforcement. This analysis builds on state-society approaches in comparative politics, but in contrast to theories that emphasize state autonomy, it focuses on key differences in the way states are porous to political influence.

How can states with weak and politicized bureaucracies enforce labor and environmental regulations? Through a study of subnational variation in Argentina, this dissertation develops a framework to explain why bureaucrats are able to enforce regulations in some cases and not others. The framework focuses on two factors: the strength of linkages between bureaucrats and civil society organizations, and the level of administrative capacity in the bureaucracy. Strong linkages can facilitate routinized resource sharing and the construction of pro-enforcement coalitions, and administrative capacity determines whether bureaucrats passively or strategically use societal resources. By explaining variation in patterns of enforcement that are obscured by existing approaches, this research opens up new possibilities for crafting strategies to strengthen regulatory institutions. The dissertation draws on data collected during sixteen months of field research, including over 250 semi-structured interviews and an original survey of labor inspectors.

Amengual investigates how labor and environmental regulations can be enforced by drawing on a study of politics in Argentina.

Describes what patronage employees do in exchange for their jobs and provides a novel explanation of why they do it.

"Compares the tax systems in Argentina and Chile. Examines differences in law abidance between the two countries and the effectiveness of legal enforcement"--Provided by publisher.

Offers a groundbreaking analysis of the distinctive substantive, theoretical and methodological contributions of subnational research in the field of comparative politics.