First published in 1979, Political Manipulation and Administrative Power examines in detail some of the means by which elites in western-style democracies have established and maintained themselves in power. It describes how elites have manipulated the public by methods which run counter to the spirit and the letter of democracy, yet without overtly disrupting the democratic system. In exploring the relationship between political corruption and class interests, the author takes issue with the Marxist perspective to argue that the type of political manipulation under discussion, and its decline in some countries, cannot be explained by the economically dominant classes’ interests. She further contends that such manipulation cannot be explained by the characteristics of the rank-and-file public, such as lack of political awareness, poverty, and disorganization. She maintains that such manipulation can be best explained by certain characteristics of the ruling elites themselves and the power structures (especially administrative) they shape and head. Using an elitist perspective in conjunction with a structural functional one, she goes on to show that the decline of such practices in some countries more than in others can be explained by the normative codes and role definitions which, once adopted and institutionalized by the elites, act as a restraint on the manner in which they entrench themselves in power. A comparative study of Britain, the USA, Australia and Israel, this book is based on general principles which make its argument applicable to other western-style democracies. It will be a beneficial read for students and researchers of politics, comparative studies, and international politics.

Winner of the Scribes Book Award “As brilliantly imaginative as it is urgently timely.” —Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Harvard Law School “At no time more than the present, a defense of expertise-based governance and administration is sorely needed, and this book provides it with gusto.” —Frederick Schauer, author of The Proof A highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? America has long been divided over these questions, but the debate has recently taken on more urgency and spilled into the streets. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed so long as public officials are constrained by morality and guided by stable rules. Officials should make clear rules, ensure transparency, and never abuse retroactivity, so that current guidelines are not under constant threat of change. They should make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing contradictory ones. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. In more robust form, they could address some of the concerns of critics who decry the “deep state” and yearn for its downfall. “Has something to offer both critics and supporters...a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of the modern state.” —Review of Politics “The authors freely admit that the administrative state is not perfect. But, they contend, it is far better than its critics allow.” —Wall Street Journal

The politics-administration dichotomy is much mentioned and often criticized in the Public Administration literature. The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: Toward a Constitutional Perspective, Second Edition offers a book-length treatment of this classical notion. While public administration academics typically reject it as an outdated and even dangerous idea, it re-emerges implicitly in their analyses. This book tells the story of how this has happened and suggests a way to get out of the quandary. It analyzes the dichotomy position in terms of content, purpose, and relevance. What’s in the Second Edition Extensive study of the politics-administration dichotomy as a classic idea in Public Administration A much-overlooked constitutionalist line of argument in defense of this widely discredited notion Exploration and further development of the intellectual legacy of Dwight Waldo Coverage of the dichotomy’s conceptual origins in 18th and 19th century Continental-European thought An assessment of main criticisms against and alternatives for the dichotomy presented in the literature Contributions to the newly emerging Constitutional School in the study of public administration An argument against the institutional separation of Political Science and Public Administration in academia Completely revised and updated, the book examines the idea that politics and public administration should be separated in our theories and practices of government. A combination of history of ideas and theoretical analysis, it reconstructs the dichotomy’s conceptual origins and classical understandings and gives an assessment of the main criticisms raised against it and the chief alternatives suggested for it. Arguing that one-sided interpretations have led to the dichotomy’s widespread but wrongful dismissal, the study shows how it can be recovered as a meaningful idea when understood as a constitutional principle. This study helps readers make sense of highly confused debates and challenge the issues with an original and provocative stance.

A timely new perspective on the impact of populism on the relationship between democracy and public administration.

Despite recent corporate scandals, the United States is among the world’s least corrupt nations. But in the nineteenth century, the degree of fraud and corruption in America approached that of today’s most corrupt developing nations, as municipal governments and robber barons alike found new ways to steal from taxpayers and swindle investors. In Corruption and Reform, contributors explore this shadowy period of United States history in search of better methods to fight corruption worldwide today. Contributors to this volume address the measurement and consequences of fraud and corruption and the forces that ultimately led to their decline within the United States. They show that various approaches to reducing corruption have met with success, such as deregulation, particularly “free banking,” in the 1830s. In the 1930s, corruption was kept in check when new federal bureaucracies replaced local administrations in doling out relief. Another deterrent to corruption was the independent press, which kept a watchful eye over government and business. These and other facets of American history analyzed in this volume make it indispensable as background for anyone interested in corruption today.

Collects 381 entries that discuss political science, international relations, and sociology.