Since its original publication, Expert Political Judgment by New York Times bestselling author Philip Tetlock has established itself as a contemporary classic in the literature on evaluating expert opinion. Tetlock first discusses arguments about whether the world is too complex for people to find the tools to understand political phenomena, let alone predict the future. He evaluates predictions from experts in different fields, comparing them to predictions by well-informed laity or those based on simple extrapolation from current trends. He goes on to analyze which styles of thinking are more successful in forecasting. Classifying thinking styles using Isaiah Berlin's prototypes of the fox and the hedgehog, Tetlock contends that the fox--the thinker who knows many little things, draws from an eclectic array of traditions, and is better able to improvise in response to changing events--is more successful in predicting the future than the hedgehog, who knows one big thing, toils devotedly within one tradition, and imposes formulaic solutions on ill-defined problems. He notes a perversely inverse relationship between the best scientific indicators of good judgement and the qualities that the media most prizes in pundits--the single-minded determination required to prevail in ideological combat. Clearly written and impeccably researched, the book fills a huge void in the literature on evaluating expert opinion. It will appeal across many academic disciplines as well as to corporations seeking to develop standards for judging expert decision-making. Now with a new preface in which Tetlock discusses the latest research in the field, the book explores what constitutes good judgment in predicting future events and looks at why experts are often wrong in their forecasts.

This work draws on research in neuroscience, physiology, and experimental psychology to conceptualize habit and reason as two mental states that interact in a delicate, highly functional balance controlled by emotion. It sheds light on a range of political behaviour, including party identification.

Steinberger's conclusion--that a coherent political society must also be a judgmental one--flies in the face of much contemporary thinking.

Originally published in 1983. One of the basic capacities of man as a political being is his faculty of judgement. Yet for all the books on concepts like freedom, equality and authority, surprisingly little attention has been given to this topic in the tradition of Western political thought. What is the nature of political judgement? What endows us, as human beings, with the ability to make reasonable judgements about human affairs and to judge the common world we share with others? By what means to we secure validity for our judgements? What are the underlying conditions of this human capacity, and what implications does it have the understanding of politics? These questions, central as they are to any reflection on politics have rarely been addressed in a systematic way. This book examines Kant’s concept of taste and Aristotle’s concept of prudence, as well as recent works of political philosophy by Arendt, Gadamer and Habermas, all crucially influenced by Kant and Aristotle.

Leading scholars re-examine political judgement, attempting to understand the relationship between political theory and political practice.

In this sweeping look at political and philosophical history, Linda M. G. Zerilli unpacks the tightly woven core of Hannah Arendt’s unfinished work on a tenacious modern problem: how to judge critically in the wake of the collapse of inherited criteria of judgment. Engaging a remarkable breadth of thinkers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Leo Strauss, Immanuel Kant, Frederick Douglass, John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, and many others, Zerilli clears a hopeful path between an untenable universalism and a cultural relativism that forever defers the possibility of judging at all. Zerilli deftly outlines the limitations of existing debates, both those that concern themselves with the impossibility of judging across cultures and those that try to find transcendental, rational values to anchor judgment. Looking at Kant through the lens of Arendt, Zerilli develops the notion of a public conception of truth, and from there she explores relativism, historicism, and universalism as they shape feminist approaches to judgment. Following Arendt even further, Zerilli arrives at a hopeful new pathway—seeing the collapse of philosophical criteria for judgment not as a problem but a way to practice judgment anew as a world-building activity of democratic citizens. The result is an astonishing theoretical argument that travels through—and goes beyond—some of the most important political thought of the modern period.

How are impressions about political candidates organized in memory? What is the nature of political group stereotypes? How do citizens make voting decisions? How do citizens formulate opinions about key issues and politics? The contributors to Political Judgment: Structure and Process reach answers to these questions that will substantially influence how the next generation of scholars working at the intersection of political science and sociology, and public opinion researchers more generally, go about their work.