Political-Economy Arguments for Uniform Tariff
Title | Political-Economy Arguments for Uniform Tariff PDF eBook |
Author | Arvind Panagariya |
Publisher | World Bank Publications |
Pages | 34 |
Release | 1991 |
Genre | Politica comercial |
ISBN |
In recent years uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular but economists have not formulated a rationale that demonstrates their superiority to alternative tariff structures. Do strong political economy arguments exist that favor uniform tariffs?
Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff
Title | Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff PDF eBook |
Author | Arvind Panagariya |
Publisher | |
Pages | 0 |
Release | 2022 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular in recent years, yet their economic rationale is not strong. We identify and evaluate three sets of reasons as to why governments may prefer tariff uniformity as a means of alleviating political motives for excessive protection. First, a free-rider effect may be conducive to less lobbying under a uniform tariff regime than under a regime in which tariffs are allowed to differ. Second, an input-price effect may dampen the enthusiasm of final-goods producers for import protection. Third, a precommitment effect may increase the cost to a future government of protecting favored sectors. None of these arguments provides an unambiguous, airtight case for tariff uniformity. The decision on uniformity has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
On the Design of Tariff Policy
Title | On the Design of Tariff Policy PDF eBook |
Author | David G. Tarr |
Publisher | |
Pages | |
Release | 2000 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
This chapter examines the arguments for and against a uniform tariff structure. Arguments against uniformity are: terms of trade; 'strategic, ' infant or restructuring industry considerations, revenue or balance of payments purposes, and tariffs as a negotiating tool at the WTO. Arguments in favor of uniformity are: political economy considerations; administrative convenience; and reduction of smuggling and corruption in customs. The author maintain that tariff uniformity is the best choice in practice. A uniform tariff conveys a number of advantages, the most important of which is that if the tariff is uniform, the gains to industry lobbying are much smaller (and may be negative), creating a kind of free-rider problem for the lobbying industry and dramatically reduces the incentive to lobby for protection. Then: (1) the level of protection is likely to be lower (the recent experience of Chile is a dramatic case in point); (2) there is a direct saving of resources from the reduced lobbying; (3) the reduction to the gains from lobbying for protection provides a vastly improved signal to valuable entrepreneurial talent which will thus be encouraged to create better and cheaper products; and (4) the reduction in resources devoted to lobbying will result in less corruption in government, which may have positive spillover effects into other dimensions of government activity.
The National System of Political Economy
Title | The National System of Political Economy PDF eBook |
Author | Friedrich List |
Publisher | |
Pages | 422 |
Release | 1904 |
Genre | Economics |
ISBN |
Political-economy arguments for a uniform tarif
Title | Political-economy arguments for a uniform tarif PDF eBook |
Author | Arvind Panagariya |
Publisher | |
Pages | 25 |
Release | 1991 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Political Economy and the Tariff Problem
Title | Political Economy and the Tariff Problem PDF eBook |
Author | William James Ashley |
Publisher | |
Pages | 22 |
Release | 1905* |
Genre | Economics |
ISBN |
The Political Economy of Trade Policy
Title | The Political Economy of Trade Policy PDF eBook |
Author | Robert C. Feenstra |
Publisher | MIT Press |
Pages | 334 |
Release | 1996 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 9780262061865 |
This collection of papers by former students and colleagues celebrates the profound impact that Jagdish Bhagwati has had on the field of international economics over the past three decades. Bhagwati, who is the Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics at Columbia University, has made pathbreaking contributions to the theory of international trade and commercial policy, including immiserizing growth, domestic distortions, economic development, and political economy. His success and influence as a teacher and mentor is widely recognized among students at both MIT and Columbia, and as founder of the Journal of International Economics, he has encouraged research on many questions of theoretical and policy relevance. The political economy of trade policy, Bhagwati's most recent area of interest, is the theme of this collection which addresses salient topics including market distortions, income distribution, and the political process of policy-making. Sections and Contributors Market Distortions, T. N. Srinivasan. Paul A. Samuelson. Paul R. Krugman * Trade and Income Distribution, Douglas A. Irwin. Richard A. Brecher and Ehsan U. Choudri. Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson. Earl L. Grinols * Perspectives on Political Economy, Robert E. Baldwin. Peter Diamond * Models of Political Economy and Trade, Gene M. Grossman and Elhana Helpman. John Douglas Wilson. B. Peter Rosendorff. Arvind Panagariya and Ronald Findlay