Provides a history of planning in Taiwan and situates contemporary Taiwanese planning in the wider global context. The book then covers challenges to planning, urban change, legal planning, land problems, the development of industrial land, community planning, conservation, ecological land use, planning for natural disasters and transportation planning.

The experimental family planning program begun in 1963 in Taichung, the provincial capital of Taiwan, was the largest intensive program of its kind ever to be carried out for a sizable concentrated population. Its use of systematic observation and measurements was also unique. In evaluating the program and the data gathered, the authors seek to establish the extent to which the decline in Taiwan's fertility level resulted from the program rather than from the changes already underway in the society at that time. Finally, two vital questions occupy them: What has been learned in Taiwan, and how much of this can be applied to other developing countries with rapid population growth? Originally published in 1969. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

Within thirty years of its humble beginnings, Taiwan was listed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as one of ten newly industrialized countries (NICs). This book charts how and why such growth took place, and discusses areas of Taiwan's experience that might be useful in helping other countries achieve economic growth and improve their living standards.The second edition includes additional chapters and updated information and statistics.The author, one of the chief architects of Taiwan's economic development, worked with the government for forty years. Here, he draws on his extensive experience. He has held important positions such as Economics Minister, Finance Minister, and Minister without Portfolio dealing with, among other inter-ministerial problems, the Science and Technology Program. Presently, he is the Senior Advisor to the President. He has been involved in the development of economic, fiscal, monetary, industrial, international trade, manpower, science and technology policies.

Stressing total quality in all aspects of architectural practice, the J.J. Pan monograph features a rich collection of building types. According to Taiwanese architect, Joshua Jih Pan, such total quality includes at least design, service and delivery whi

Exposing internal Chinese military documents and restricted-access studies, The Chinese Invasion Threat explores the secret world of war planning and strategy, espionage and national security. The untold story of the most dangerous flashpoint of our times.

The rapid growth of Taiwan's postwar miracle economy is most frequently credited to the leading role of the state in promoting economic development. Megan Greene challenges this standard interpretation in the first in-depth examination of the origins of Taiwan's developmental state. Greene examines the ways in which the Guomindang state planned and promoted scientific and technical development both in mainland China between 1927 and 1949 and on Taiwan after 1949. Using industrial science policy as a lens, she shows that the state, even during its most authoritarian periods, did not function as a monolithic entity. State planners were concerned with maximizing the use of Taiwan's limited resources for industrial development. Political leaders, on the other hand, were most concerned with the state's political survival. The developmental state emerged gradually as a result of the combined efforts of technocrats and outsiders, including academicians and foreign advisors. Only when the political leadership put its authority and weight behind the vision of these early planners did Taiwan's developmental state fully come into being. In Taiwan's combination of technocratic expertise and political authoritarianism lie implications for our understanding of changes taking place in mainland China today.