The primary thrust of the monograph is to explain the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms f the instability it wreaks upon government and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these "new" nonstate actors must eventually seize political power in order to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that the third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. As a consequence, the "Duck Analogy" applies. Third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks - a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless! This monograph concludes with recommendations for the United States and other countries to focus security and assistance responses at the strategic level. The intent is to help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena.

Without money, terrorists cannot function as organizations and cannot conduct attacks. Yet the questions remain, how vulnerable are terrorists to financial disruptions? Can governments put pressure on their finances in meaningful ways or are they too resilient and adaptive to be affected by state actions? These and other questions about terrorism financing are vigorously debated by scholars and policymakers, particularly since the attacks of September 11th 2001 . While there is a growing literature on policy issues, strategies, and countermeasures, states must first understand their enemies before developing strategies to defeat them. So, instead of focusing on the state response, this book asks a more foundational question: How do different terrorist groups actually raise money? What are their budgets? What do their portfolios look like? How have they changed over time? What are the advantages and disadvantages of different sources of financing? The book includes case studies of 11 different terrorist groups or sets of groups within a country. It is clear that each group has a different portfolio tailored to their needs and their environment and this makes countering terrorist financing more challenging for the state. This topical book will be required reading for all students and scholars interested in terrorism financing as well as those working in government agencies tasked with combating terrorist groups and their financial resources.

Introduction -- Approach -- Insurgency -- Chronic insurgency and shadow governance -- Counterinsurgency -- Historical analysis : four different outcomes -- Group 1 : insurgent victories -- Group 2 : government victories -- Group 3 : degenerate insurgencies -- Group 4 : success through co-option -- Lessons -- A strategy of co-option -- Implications for Iraq and Afghanistan -- Conclusion.

In this book, Horace Bartilow develops a theory of embedded corporatism to explain the U.S. government's war on drugs. Stemming from President Richard Nixon's 1971 call for an international approach to this "war," U.S. drug enforcement policy has persisted with few changes to the present day, despite widespread criticism of its effectiveness and of its unequal effects on hundreds of millions of people across the Americas. While researchers consistently emphasize the role of race in U.S. drug enforcement, Bartilow's empirical analysis highlights the class dimension of the drug war and the immense power that American corporations wield within the regime. Drawing on qualitative case study methods, declassified U.S. government documents, and advanced econometric estimators that analyze cross-national data, Bartilow demonstrates how corporate power is projected and embedded—in lobbying, financing of federal elections, funding of policy think tanks, and interlocks with the federal government and the military. Embedded corporatism, he explains, creates the conditions by which interests of state and nonstate members of the regime converge to promote capital accumulation. The subsequent human rights repression, illiberal democratic governments, antiworker practices, and widening income inequality throughout the Americas, Bartilow argues, are the pathological policy outcomes of embedded corporatism in drug enforcement.

For supplementary documentation and useful websites, click here. This perceptive book critically explores why the United States continues to pursue failed policies in Latin America. What elements of the U.S. and Latin American political systems have allowed the Cold War, the war on drugs, and the war on terror to be conflated? Why do U.S. policies--ostensibly designed to promote the rule of law, human rights, and democracy--instead contribute to widespread corruption, erosion of government authority, human rights violations, and increasing destabilization? Why have the war on drugs and the war on terror neither reduced narcotics trafficking nor increased citizen security in Latin America? Why do Latin American governments, the European Union, and U.S. policymakers often work at cross-purposes when they all claim to be committed to "democratization" and "development" in the region? Leading scholars answer these questions by detailing the nature of U.S. economic and security strategies in Latin America and the Andean region since 1990. They analyze the impacts and responses to these strategies by policymakers, political leaders, and social movements throughout the region, explaining how programs often generate or exacerbate the very problems they were intended to solve. Reviewing official policy and its defenders and critics alike, this indispensable book focuses on the reasons for the failure of U.S. policies and their disastrous significance for Latin America and the United States alike. Contributions by: Adri n Bonilla, Pilar Gait n, Monica Herz, Kenneth Lehman, Brian Loveman, Enrique Obando, Orlando J. P rez, Eduardo Pizarro, Philipp Sch nrock-Mart nez, and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian