Wolfgang Stegmuller was born on June 3rd, 1923, at Natters near Innsbruck. He received his doctorates in economics and philosophy in 1945 and 1947 respectively, and his qualification (Habilitation) for lecturing in philosophy in 1949. He has been Professor of Philosophy, Logic, and Philosophy of Science at the Ludwig Maximilian University at Munich since 1958. He reintroduced analytic philosophy and philosophy of science in Germany by teaching and by publishing both introductory texts and research work in these areas; the present understanding of the term "Wissenschaftstheorie" is largely shaped by his work. At the same time he has shown a remarkable ability to interpret philosophical work in other areas of philosophy, even when that work is shaped by different premises and proceeds by very different methods and standards of clarity than his own. He is one of the very few philosophers in the world to have succeeded in creating an important new line of research in technical philosophy while keeping a synoptic view of what is transpiring in philosophy as a whole. Among Stegmuller's major publications are the books Hauptstromungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Skepsis, Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, The Struc­ turalist View of Theories, and Rationale Rekonstruktion von Wissenschaft und ihrem Wandel (which contains an "Autobiographische Einleitung"). Some of these books have been translated into English and Spanish.

Paul Feyerabend ranks among the most exciting and influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century. This reconstruction of his developing ideas combines historical and systematic considerations. Part I examines the three main influences on Feyerabend’s philosophical development: Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Popper critical rationalism and Ehrenhaft’s experimental effects. Part II focuses on Feyerabend’s development and use of the notion of incommensurability at the heart of his philosophical critiques, and investigates his relation to realism. Feyerabend initially developed the notion of incommensurability from ideas he found in Duhem. He used the notion of incommensurability to attack many different forms of conceptual conservativism in philosophy and the natural sciences. He argued against many views on the grounds that that they would constrain the freedom necessary to develop alternative points of view, and thereby hinder scientific advance. Contrary to widespread opinion, he was never a scientific realist. Part III reconstructs Feyerabend’s pluralistic conception of knowledge in the context of his pluralistic philosophical method. Feyerabend was a philosophical pluralist, who practiced pluralism in pursuit of progress.

Originally published in 1963. In an introductory chapter the author argues that philosophy ought to be more than the art of clarifying thought and that it should concern itself with outlining a scientifically plausible world view. Early chapters deal with phenomenalism and the reality of theoretical entities, and with the relation between the physical and biological sciences. Free will, issues of time and space and man’s place in nature are covered in later chapters.

The more than forty readings in this anthology cover the most important developments of the past six decades, charting the rise and decline of logical positivism and the gradual emergence of a new consensus concerning the major issues and theoretical options in the field. As an introduction to the philosophy of science, it stands out for its scope, its coverage of both historical and contemporary developments, and its detailed introductions to each area discussed.

First Published in 2014. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The most important and exciting recent development in the philosophy of science is its merging with the sociology of scientific knowledge. Here is the first text book to make this development available.