In his writings, Hume talks of our 'gilding and staining' natural objects, and of the mind's propensity to 'spread itself' on the world. This has led commentators to use the metaphor of 'projection' in connection with his philosophy: Hume is held to have taught that causal power and self are projections, that God is a projection of our fear, and that value is a projection of sentiment. By considering what it is about Hume's writing that occasions this metaphor, P. J. E. Kail spells out its meaning, the role it plays in Hume's work, and examines how, if at all, what sounds 'projective' in Hume can be reconciled with what sounds 'realist'. In addition to offering some highly original readings of Hume's central ideas, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy offers a detailed examination of the notion of projection and the problems it faces.

Tim Button explores the relationship between minds, words, and world. He argues that the two main strands of scepticism are deeply related and can be overcome, but that there is a limit to how much we can show. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to say exactly where.

Scholastic realism is a type of moderate realism. As such, it falls between platonism and nominalism on the issue of universals. Universals, strictly speaking, only exist in minds, but they are founded on real relations of similarity in the world. Scholastic realism goes beyond moderate realism and affirms that universals also exist transcendently; but instead of having a separated existence, transcendent universals exist in God's mind. This work argues that moderate realism is implied by the correct analysis of predication and persons, and that Scholastic realism, in particular, is implied by the correct analysis of knowledge, truth, and right action.

This book fills a gap in the literature of 21st century international visual arts education by providing a structured approach to understanding the benefits of Philosophical Realism in art education, an approach that has received little international attention until now. The framework as presented provides a powerful interface between research and practical reconceptualisations of critical issues and practice in the domains of art, design, and education that involve implications for curriculum in visual arts, teaching and learning, cognitive development, and creativity. The book extends understanding of Philosophical Realism in its practical application to teaching practice in visual arts in the way it relates to the fields of art, design, and education. Researchers, teacher educators and specialist art teachers are informed about how Philosophical Realism provides insights into art, design, and education. These insights vary from clearer knowledge about art to the examination of beliefs and assumptions about the art object. Readers learn how cognitive reflection, and social and practical reasoning in the classroom help cultivate students’ artistic performances, and understand how constraints function in students’ reasoning at different ages/stages of education.

In Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view—according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths—is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensive—defending Robust Realism against traditional objections—it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections. The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed here—the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)—are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.