Philosphical medical ethics forms the basis of the codes of conduct and legal constraints involved in doctors' professional lives. This series of articles presents a British approach to the concepts, assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, and arguments underlying medico-moral decision-making in the context of medical practice. The book serves as an introduction whose aim is to encourage more rigorous analysis of the moral dilemmas confronting all physicians and to contribute to a comprehensive and coherent moral theory for medical practice.

Offers classic, well-written articles that have stood the test of time and have something to teach on the subject of medical ethics.

What is Bioethics? What are its goals and theoretical assumptions? Is it a unique discipline? Must medical ethics be grounded in clinical experience? How can ethical inquiry inform medicine's theory and practice? Must one have a definition of medicine before one can have a medical ethic? Does medicine have a unique or demarcating body of knowledge, methodology, or philosophy? These troubling questions are addressed by a distinguished roster of philosophers, theologians, lawyers, social scientists, physicians and scientists. The unifying theme of this text is a philosophical exploration of the history, nature, scope and foundations of bioethics. There is a critical evaluation of principled, communitarian, legal, narrative and feminist approaches. The book's interdisciplinary focus allows for a lively dialogue which includes papers and accompanying commentaries. Audience: Philosophers of science and medical ethicists, physicians, lawyers, policy makers.

The idea of reviewing the ethical concerns of ancient medicine with an eye as to how they might instruct us about the extremely lively disputes of our own contemporary medicine is such a natural one that it surprises us to real ize how very slow we have been to pursue it in a sustained way_ Ideologues have often seized on the very name of Hippocrates to close off debate about such matters as abortion and euthanasia - as if by appeal to a well-known and sacred authority that no informed person would care or dare to oppose_ And yet, beneath the polite fakery of such reference, we have deprived our selves of a familiarity with the genuinely 'unsimple' variety of Greek and Roman reflections on the great questions of medical ethics. The fascination of recovering those views surely depends on one stunning truism at least: humans sicken and die; they must be cared for by those who are socially endorsed to specialize in the task; and the changes in the rounds of human life are so much the same from ancient times to our own that the disputes and agreements of the past are remarkably similar to those of our own.

Explores the philosophical and practical ethical implications of a definition of health as a state that allows us to reach our goals. Definitions of health and disease are of more than theoretical interest. Understanding what it means to be healthy has implications for choices in medical treatment, for ethically sound informed consent, and for accurate assessment of policies or programs. This deeper understanding can help us create more effective public policy for health and medicine. It is notable that such contentious legal initiatives as the Americans with Disability Act and the Patients' Bill of Rights fail to define adequately the medical terms on which their effectiveness depends. In Ethics and the Metaphysics of Medicine, Kenneth Richman develops an "embedded instrumentalist" theory of health and applies it to practical problems in health care and medicine, addressing topics that range from the philosophy of science to knee surgery. "Embedded instrumentalist" theories hold that health is a match between one's goals and one's ability to reach those goals, and that the relevant goals may vary from individual to individual. This captures the normative implications of the term health while avoiding problematic relativism. Richman's embedded instrumentalism differs from other theories of health in drawing a distinction between the health of individuals as biological organisms and the health of individuals as moral agents. This distinction illuminates many difficulties in patient-provider communication and helps us understand conflicts between promoting health and promoting ethically permissible behavior. After exploring, expanding, and defending this theory in the first part of the book, Richman examines its ethical implications, discussing such concerns as the connection between medical beneficence and respect for autonomy, patient-provider communication, living wills, and clinical education.

In this unique study Fulford combines the disciplines of rigorous philosophy with an intimate knowledge of psychopathology to overturn traditional hegemonies. The patient replaces the doctor at the heart of medicine. Moral theory and the logic of evaluation replace epistemology as the focus of philosophical enquiry. Ever controversial, mental illness is at the interface of philosophy and medicine. Mad or bad? Dissident or diseased? Dr Fulford shows that it is possible to achieve new insights into these traditional dilemmas, insights at once practically relevant and philosophically significant.