Simplicius, the greatest surviving ancient authority on Aristotle's Physics , lived in the sixth century A. D. He produced detailed commentaries on several of Aristotle's works. Those on the Physics, which alone come to over 1,300 pages in the original Greek, preserve a centuries-old tradition of ancient scholarship on Aristotle. In Physics Book 5 Aristotle lays down some of the principles of his dynamics and theory of change. What does not count as change: change of relation? The flux of time? There is no change of change, yet acceleration is recognised. Aristotle defines 'continuous', 'contact' and 'next', and uses these definitions in discussing when we can claim that the same change or event is still going on. This volume is complemented by David Konstan's translation of Simplicius' commentary on Physics Book 6, which has already appeared in this series. It is Book 6 that gives spatial application to the terms defined in Book 5, and uses them to mount a celebrated attack on atomism. Simplicius' commentaries enrich our understanding of the Physics and of its interpretation in the ancient world.

Explores a range of questions about the basic structure of reality, the nature of prime matter, the principles of change, the relation between form and matter, and the issue of whether things can come into being out of nothing, and if so, in what sense that is true.

Book 3 of Aristotle's Physics primarily concerns two important concepts for his theory of nature: change and infinity. Change is important because, in Book 2, he has defined nature - the subject-matter of the Physics - as an internal source of change. Much of his discussion is dedicated to showing that the change occurs in the patient which undergoes it, not in the agent which causes it. Thus Book 3 is an important step in clearing the way for Book 8's claims for a divine mover who causes change but in whom no change occurs. The second half of Book 3 introduces Aristotle's doctrine of infinity as something which is always potential, never actual, never traversed and never multiplied. Here, as elsewhere, Philoponus the Christian turns Aristotle's own infinity arguments against the pagan Neoplatonist belief in a beginningless universe. Such a universe, Philoponus replies, would involve actual infinity of past years already traversed, and a multiple number of past days. The commentary also contains intimations of the doctrine of impetus - which has been regarded, in its medieval context, as a scientific revolution - as well as striking examples of Philoponus' use of thought experiments to establish philosophical and broadly scientific conclusions.

In some of his most famous works, John Philoponus (c. 490-570 CE) confronts numerous aspects of Aristotle's philosophy and science. Yet the influence of these reinterpretations and critiques remains under-examined. This volume fills this gap by uncovering the considerable impact of Philoponus' natural philosophy in both the medieval and Renaissance periods. Divided into three parts, the first part of the volume introduces central concepts in Philoponus' philosophy. Highlighting the areas of crossover as well as of disagreement with Aristotle, chapters dedicate specific attention to Philoponus' theories of place, matter and vacuum; his ideas of motion; his discussion of the heavens and the fifth element; and his anthropology. This is followed, in parts two and three, by a focus on Philoponus' reception in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance respectively. Shedding light on the scientific ideas circulating in these periods, international experts explore a range of topics from the renewal of Aristotelianism in the Arab world, through the medieval Byzantine and Latin traditions, to Philoponus' appearance in the early works of Galileo. Engaging with a number of Philoponus' key tracts, The Reception of John Philoponus' Natural Philosophy is both a much-needed study of Philoponus' influence and a revealing analysis of how Aristotelian science was received, adapted, critiqued and mediated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

This companion to J. O. Urmson's translation in the same series of Simplicius' Corollaries on Place and Time contains Simplicius' commentary on the chapters on place and time in Aristotle's Physics book 4. It is a rich source for the preceding 800 years' discussion of Aristotle's views. Simplicius records attacks on Aristotle's claim that time requires change, or consciousness. He reports a rebuttal of the Pythagorean theory that history will repeat itself exactly. He evaluates Aristotle's treatment of Zeno's paradox concerning place. Throughout he elucidates the structure and meaning of Aristotle's argument, and all the more clearly for having separated off his own views into the Corollaries.

Book 2 of the Physics is arguably the best introduction to Aristotle's work, both because it explains some of his central concepts, such as nature and the four causes, and because it asks some gripping questions that are still debated today: Is chance something real? If so, what? Can nature be explained by chance, necessity and natural selection, or is it purposive? Philoponus' commentary is not only a valuable guide, but also a work of Neoplatonism with its own views on causation, the Providence of Nature, the problem of evil and the immortality of the soul.

Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) was one of the most important philosophers and theologians of Early Modern Scholasticism. Although Suárez spent most of his academic career as a professor of theology, he is better known today for his Metaphysical Disputations (Salamanca, 1597). The present volume contains a facing-page English translation of Metaphysical Disputation I, which is introductory and devoted to the nature of metaphysics itself. In it, Suárez first specifies this science’s object and nature (Sections 1 and 2) and then discusses its unity (Section 3), its end, utility and functions (Section 4), its status as the most perfect natural science and true wisdom (Section 5), and finally the thesis that it is the science most of all desired by means of a natural appetite (Section 6). Those interested in late scholastic conceptions of metaphysics and their influence on the better known metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century – e.g., Descartes’s – will find the volume especially useful. The Latin text contained in this volume introduces a significant number of corrections to the text of the Vivès edition, the one standardly used by scholars of Suárez, and thus more faithfully reproduces the text of the first edition. The volume also contains a lengthy introduction that provides a detailed survey of the disputation’s principal claims and arguments.