While phenomenology and Yogacara Buddhism are both known for their investigations of consciousness, there exists a core tension between them: phenomenology affirms the existence of essence, whereas Yogacara Buddhism argues that everything is empty of essence (svabhava). How is constructive cultural exchange possible when traditions hold such contradictory views? Answering this question and positioning both philosophical traditions in their respective intellectual and linguistic contexts, Jingjing Li argues that what Edmund Husserl means by essence differs from what Chinese Yogacarins mean by svabhava, partly because Husserl problematises the substantialist understanding of essence in European philosophy. Furthermore, she reveals that Chinese Yogacara has developed an account of self-transformation, ethics and social ontology that renders it much more than simply a Buddhist version of Husserlian phenomenology. Detailing the process of finding a middle ground between the two traditions, this book demonstrates how both can thrive together in order to overcome Orientalism.

Recent discussions of self-realization have devolved into unscientific theories of self-help. However, this vague and often misused concept is connected to many important individual and social problems. As long as its meaning remains unclear, it can be abused for social, political, and commercial malpractices. To combat this issue, this book shares perspectives from scholars of various philosophical traditions. Each chapter takes new steps in asking what the meaning of self-realization is–both in terms of what it means to understand who or what one is, and also in terms of how one can, or should, fulfilll oneself. The conceptual elucidations achieved from both theoretical and practical perspectives allow for a more mature awareness of how to deal with discourses on self-realization and, in any case, can help to demystify the subject.

One of the most important characteristics of present day ontological research is the growing interest in, and emphasis on, the dynamic aspects of being and the process-relational character of being itself. However, many important questions still await detailed answers. For example, what is the meaning of the concepts of “dynamics,” “dynamicity,” and “dynamic ontology,” among others? Are they identical to, or similar with, respectively, “processes,” “process ontology,” “process-relational ontology”? Is “process ontology” a type of “dynamic ontology”? Dynamic Being: Essays in Process-Relational Ontology examines these and many other questions, and suggests fruitful approaches in dealing with such questions. The book carries out two main tasks: first, investigating developments in the theory of dynamic and process-relational ontologies, and, second, exploring developments in the application of these ontologies. The second task is multidisciplinary in character. The authors of the chapters in this volume are specialists not only in philosophy, but also in other fields of science, including psychology, biology, mathematics, logic, and computer science, their work providing a “seed-bed” of novel possibilities for cooperative interdisciplinary research.