This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions to the field of public choice.

Discusses voting, tax policy, government regulation, redistribution of wealth, and international negotiation in a new approach to government

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

This book argues that while the US president makes foreign policy decisions based largely on political pressures, it is concentrated interests that shape the incentive structures in which he and other top officials operate. The author identifies three groups most likely to be influential: government contractors, the national security bureaucracy, and foreign governments. This book shows that the public choice perspective is superior to a theory of grand strategy in explaining the most important aspects of American foreign policy, including the war on terror, policy toward China, and the distribution of US forces abroad. Arguing that American leaders are selected to respond to public opinion, not necessarily according to their ability to formulate and execute long-terms plans, the author shows how mass attitudes are easily malleable in the domain of foreign affairs due to ignorance with regard to the topic, the secrecy that surrounds national security issues, the inherent complexity of the issues involved, and most importantly, clear cases of concentrated interests. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of American Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis and Global Governance.

In this volume, Sir Alan Peacock, one of Britain's most noted public economists, poses the question as to whether the history of economic thought is an essential part of the training of public finance economists. He argues that the perspective gained by studying the origins of public choice analysis can offer an important stimulus to scientific progress. The first lecture analyses the increasing popularity in recent years of the modernist, anti-historical point of view. The second criticises those theories of growth in government expenditure which ignore the political process. The third lecture draws on Adam Smith and David Hume to extend the conventional economic model of bureaucracy. In the final lecture, Peacock considers the problem of controlling public sector growth and points to ways of overcoming them. The book ends with short commentaries by seven public economists.

Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other "rational" actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy.

A distinctive perspective on governance: the building blocks -- Classical liberalism : delineating its theory of governance -- Function, structure, and process at the private-public interface -- Dynamic governance : the polycentrism process and knowledge processes -- Public choice and public administration : the confluence -- Public administration and public choice : charting the field -- Public choice, public administration, and self-governance : the Ostromian confluence -- Heterogeneity, coproduction, and polycentric governance : the Ostroms' public choice institutionalism revisited -- Framing the applied level : themes, issue areas, and cases -- Metropolitan governance : polycentric solutions for complex problems -- Independent regulatory agencies and their reform : an exercise in institutional imagination -- Polycentric stakeholder analysis : corporate governance and corporate social responsibility -- Conclusions: governance and public management : a vindication of the classical-liberal perspective?