International criminal law lacks a coherent account of individual responsibility. This failure is due to the inability of international tribunals to capture the distinctive nature of individual responsibility for crimes that are collective by their very nature. Specifically, they have misunderstood the nature of the collective action or framework that makes these crimes possible, and for which liability may be attributed to intellectual authors, policy makers and leaders. In this book, the author draws on insights from comparative law and methodology to propose doctrines of perpetration and secondary responsibility that reflect the role and function of high-level participants in mass atrocity, while simultaneously situating them within the political and social climate which renders these crimes possible. This new doctrine is developed through a novel approach which combines and restructures divergent theoretical perspectives on attribution of responsibility in English and German domestic criminal law, as major representatives of the common law and civil law systems. At the same time, it analyses existing theories of responsibility in international criminal law and assesses whether there is any justification for their retention by international criminal tribunals.

When a perpetrator of an international crime argues in his defence that he did not realise that he had violated the law, is this a reason not to punish him? International crimes constitute serious offences and it could be argued that he who commits such an offence must know his act is punishable. After all, everyone is presumed to know the law. However, convicting someone who is mistaken about the wrongfulness of his act may be in violation of the principle ‘no punishment without guilt’. This book investigates when 'mistake of law' should be a reason to exculpate the perpetrator of an international crime. It demonstrates that the issue of 'mistake of law' goes to the heart of individual criminal responsibility and therewith contributes to the development of a more systematic approach toward the structure of international offences. Valuable for academics and practitioners in the field of International Criminal Law.

International criminal law lacks a coherent account of individual responsibility. This failure is due to the inability of international tribunals to capture the distinctive nature of individual responsibility for crimes that are collective by their very nature. Specifically, they have misunderstood the nature of the collective action or framework that makes these crimes possible, and for which liability may be attributed to intellectual authors, policy makers and leaders. In this book, the author draws on insights from comparative law and methodology to propose doctrines of perpetration and secondary responsibility that reflect the role and function of high-level participants in mass atrocity, while simultaneously situating them within the political and social climate which renders these crimes possible. This new doctrine is developed through a novel approach which combines and restructures divergent theoretical perspectives on attribution of responsibility in English and German domestic criminal law, as major representatives of the common law and civil law systems. At the same time, it analyses existing theories of responsibility in international criminal law and assesses whether there is any justification for their retention by international criminal tribunals.

Presently, many of the greatest debates and controversies in international criminal law concern modes of liability for international crimes. The state of the law is unclear, to the detriment of accountability for major crimes and of the uniformity of international criminal law. The present book aims at clarifying the state of the law and provides a thorough analysis of the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, as well as of the debates and the questions these debates have left open. Renowned international criminal law scholars analyze, in discrete chapters, the modes of liability one by one; for each mode they identify the main trends in the jurisprudence and the main points of controversy. An introduction addresses the cross-cutting issues, and a conclusion anticipates possible evolutions that we may see in the future. The research on which this book is based was undertaken with the Geneva Academy.

The proper construction of co-perpetration responsibility in international criminal law has become one of the most enduring controversies in this field, with the UN Tribunals endorsing the theory of joint criminal enterprise, and the International Criminal Court adopting the alternative joint control over the crime theory to define this mode of liability. This book seeks to reconcile the ICTY/R’s and ICC’s jurisprudence by providing a definition of co-perpetration that could be uniformly applied in the two justice models that these institutions represent: the ad hoc- and the treaty-based model. An evaluation framework is adopted, pursuant to which the origins, merits and deficiencies of the said competing theories are critically assessed, and a refined legal framework of co-perpetration responsibility is proposed.

This volume deals with the tension between unity and diversification which has gained a central place in the debate under the label of ‘fragmentation’. It explores the meaning, articulation and risks of this phenomenon in a specific area: International Criminal Justice. It brings together established and fresh voices who analyse different sites and contestations of this concept, as well as its context and specific manifestations in the interpretation and application of International Criminal Law. The volume thereby connects discourse on ‘fragmentation’ with broader inquiry on the merits and discontents of legal pluralism in ‘Public International Law’.

Anchored by the normative framework, this book aims to clarify the basis for individual criminal liability for persons who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes. The objective of this monograph is to clarify the rules to enable international courts and tribunals to identify the extent to which individual criminal liability attaches to the financing of core crimes, as well as the legal basis for such liability. By clarifying the criminal liability of individual who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes, this book also seeks to clarify the mental elements of the mode of liability of aiding and abetting. This is achieved through a thorough analysis of the applicable rules in the international arena, as well as through the comparative analysis.