Eighteen essays on the failure of diplomatic efforts by the US and Japan between the two world wars--the problems that thwarted diplomacy, the possible avoidability of the Pacific War. The collection serves as a retroactive study in peace research as well as a study in diplomatic history. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

This book provides students with an understanding of the motives behind the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the consequences of this action on Japan, on the United States, and on the outcome of World War II. This essential reference guide is devoted to one of the most important military events in American history: the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941, "the day of infamy." Distinguished military historian Spencer C. Tucker is the editor of this thorough study of the Japanese attack that contains reference entries as well as primary documents and oral histories describing the circumstances that led up to the attack, the event itself, and its immediate aftermath and consequences, thereby providing readers with the necessary context to understand all aspects of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Readers will understand why Japanese leaders decided to go to war with the United States, what they expected to accomplish in attacking Pearl Harbor, why this key American base was not better defended, and what the aftereffects of the attack were for the outcome of the war. Biographies on major players in the crisis such as Franklin Roosevelt, Chester Nimitz, Isoroku Yamamoto, and Hideki Tojo will provide insight into the individuals who played key roles in the events before, during, and after December 7, 1941.

This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which, by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the international implications of effective cryptography and successful cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment, total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages. Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages, might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.

A groundbreaking history that considers the attack on Pearl Harbor from the Japanese perspective and is certain to revolutionize how we think of the war in the Pacific. When Japan launched hostilities against the United States in 1941, argues Eri Hotta, its leaders, in large part, understood they were entering a war they were almost certain to lose. Drawing on material little known to Western readers, and barely explored in depth in Japan itself, Hotta poses an essential question: Why did these men—military men, civilian politicians, diplomats, the emperor—put their country and its citizens so unnecessarily in harm’s way? Introducing us to the doubters, schemers, and would-be patriots who led their nation into this conflagration, Hotta brilliantly shows us a Japan rarely glimpsed—eager to avoid war but fraught with tensions with the West, blinded by reckless militarism couched in traditional notions of pride and honor, tempted by the gambler’s dream of scoring the biggest win against impossible odds and nearly escaping disaster before it finally proved inevitable. In an intimate account of the increasingly heated debates and doomed diplomatic overtures preceding Pearl Harbor, Hotta reveals just how divided Japan’s leaders were, right up to (and, in fact, beyond) their eleventh-hour decision to attack. We see a ruling cadre rich in regional ambition and hubris: many of the same leaders seeking to avoid war with the United States continued to adamantly advocate Asian expansionism, hoping to advance, or at least maintain, the occupation of China that began in 1931, unable to end the second Sino-Japanese War and unwilling to acknowledge Washington’s hardening disapproval of their continental incursions. Even as Japanese diplomats continued to negotiate with the Roosevelt administration, Matsuoka Yosuke, the egomaniacal foreign minister who relished paying court to both Stalin and Hitler, and his facile supporters cemented Japan’s place in the fascist alliance with Germany and Italy—unaware (or unconcerned) that in so doing they destroyed the nation’s bona fides with the West. We see a dysfunctional political system in which military leaders reported to both the civilian government and the emperor, creating a structure that facilitated intrigues and stoked a jingoistic rivalry between Japan’s army and navy. Roles are recast and blame reexamined as Hotta analyzes the actions and motivations of the hawks and skeptics among Japan’s elite. Emperor Hirohito and General Hideki Tojo are newly appraised as we discover how the two men fumbled for a way to avoid war before finally acceding to it. Hotta peels back seventy years of historical mythologizing—both Japanese and Western—to expose all-too-human Japanese leaders torn by doubt in the months preceding the attack, more concerned with saving face than saving lives, finally drawn into war as much by incompetence and lack of political will as by bellicosity. An essential book for any student of the Second World War, this compelling reassessment will forever change the way we remember those days of infamy.

The Road to Pearl Harbor offers a timely examination of the conflict in the Pacific prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor and offers lessons applicable to understanding contemporary Great Power flash points between Asia and the West. This volume brings together renowned historians and analysts of grand strategy to map out the fateful decisions that culminated in war. The contributors take a pragmatic view of the policy and strategy options, as well as the decisions made by the leaders of the great powers. This important history underscores that the choices made by political, military, and naval leaders mattered in determining questions of war and peace. Highlighting Japan’s war against China and the protracted resistance of Chiang-Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime, The Road to Pearl Harbor provides historical context for understanding the struggle for mastery in Asia and decisions for war. The book also makes an important contribution to interwar naval history by examining the views of the Japanese navy’s leaders, who wanted to build up their navy to defeat Britain and the United States at sea. This history is certainly relevant, as the concluding chapter demonstrates in an eye-opening examination of the current views held by Chinese naval officers about how to fight a future war in the Pacific.