Bertrand de Rossanet is the pen name of a senior international civil servant who has been involved in negotiations and other activities carried out by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia from its earliest days. In this fascinating short book, which fits well into the Nijhoff Law Specials series, he describes and analyses the events which have taken place since 1992 with great skill, and with an understanding shared by few. Bertrand de Rossanet's long experience, together with his inside knowledge, provides a vantage point from which unique observations can be made. Nobody who wishes to comprehend the peacemaking and peacekeeping processes being played out in the former Yugoslavia, should miss reading this very special volume.

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

From Rwanda to Somalia to the former Yugoslavia, one feature of the post-Cold War world has become dreadfully clear. Ethnic conflicts are escalating, and with them demands for international intervention. But legally most ethnic conflicts are "internal" matters. How are international organizations, their resources stretched woefully thin, to know when intervention is appropriate or possible? This volume addresses the changing nature of relations between war-torn multiethnic states and international organizations, particularly the United Nations and its agencies. Are the established norms that limit intervention in ethnic conflicts adequate to contemporary conditions? Can international organizations meet the increasing demand? If not, what are the consequences of the disparities between established norms, current capabilities, and expanding expectations—and how might these disparities be narrowed? The contributors explore the desirability and potential effectiveness of international interventions in ethnic conflicts. Detailed studies of two specific cases of severe and violent tensions, in Lebanon and Yugoslavia, complement the general discussion with particular insights into the risks and exigencies of international attempts to manage ethnic civil war. A deeply thoughtful overview of one of the most pressing and perplexing issues confronting the world today, this volume clarifies the changing role of international organizations in an increasingly fragmented world.

An in-depth 2007 analysis of the sources of success and failure in UN peacekeeping missions in civil wars.

A ciritical overview of the policies of NATO governments and major human rights organizations during the Yugoslav conflict.

One of the most vexing issues that has faced the international community since the end of the Cold War has been the use of force by the United Nations peacekeeping forces. UN intervention in civil wars, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile or incomplete and where there is little peace to keep. Complex questions arise in these circumstances. When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves, to protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure compliance by recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers possible or is this simply war by another name? Is there a grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.