One message of Peace Process is that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a crucial role in helping Israel and her Arab neighbors reach peace. If American presidents play their role with skill, they can make a lasting contribution. But just as likely, they may misread the realities of the Middle East and add to the impasse by their own errors.

Many of the deep-rooted human conflicts that seize our attention today are not ready for formal mediation and negotiation. People do not negotiate about identity, fear, historic grievance, and injustice. Sustained dialogue provides a space where citizens outside government can change their conflictual relationships. Governments can negotiate binding agreements and enforce and implement them, but only citizens can change human relationships. Governments have long had their tools of diplomacy - mediation, negotiation, force, and allocation of resources. Harold H. Saunders' A Public Peace Process provides citizens outside government with their own instrument for transforming conflict. Saunders outlines a systematic approach for citizens to use in reducing racial, ethnic, and other deep-rooted tensions in their countries, communities, and organizations.

Soon after the Oslo accords were signed in September 1993 by Israel and Palestinian Liberation Organization, Edward Said predicted that they could not lead to real peace. In these essays, most written for Arab and European newspapers, Said uncovers the political mechanism that advertises reconciliation in the Middle East while keeping peace out of the picture. Said argues that the imbalance in power that forces Palestinians and Arab states to accept the concessions of the United States and Israel prohibits real negotiations and promotes the second-class treatment of Palestinians. He documents what has really gone on in the occupied territories since the signing. He reports worsening conditions for the Palestinians critiques Yasir Arafat's self-interested and oppressive leadership, denounces Israel's refusal to recognize Palestine's past, and—in essays new to this edition—addresses the resulting unrest. In this unflinching cry for civic justice and self-determination, Said promotes not a political agenda but a transcendent alternative: the peaceful coexistence of Arabs and Jews enjoying equal rights and shared citizenship.

Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2015 The term peace process is now widely used to describe attempts to manage and resolve conflict. As the nature of conflict has changed, so the range of available tools for producing peace has grown. Alongside a plethora of political actions, there is now a greater international awareness of how peace can be brokered and policed. As a result, peace processes now extend well beyond the actuality of ceasefires and an absence of war to cover legacy issues of victims, truth and reconciliation. This book expertly examines the practical application of solutions to conflict. The first part analyses various political means of conflict management, including consociational power-sharing, partition, federalism and devolution. The second explores the extent to which these political formulas have been applied - or ignored - in a wide range of conflicts including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, the Basque Region and Sri Lanka. Comparative Peace Processes combines optimism with a realist approach to conflict management, acknowledging that the propensity of dominant states to engage in political experimentation is conditioned by the state of conflict. It will be a valuable resource for anyone interested in general theories of political possibilities in peace processes and the practical deployment of political ideas in conflict zones.

This political biography sheds new light on the vital role played by the Israeli Prime Minister in establishing peaceful relations with Egypt. Focusing on the character and personality of Menachem Begin, Gerald Steinberg and Ziv Rubinovitz offer a new look into the peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s. Begin’s role as a peace negotiator has often been marginalized, but this sympathetic and critical portrait restores him to the center of the diplomatic process. Beginning with the events of 1967, Steinberg and Rubinovitz look at Begin’s statements on foreign policy, including relations with Egypt, and his role as Prime Minister and chief signer of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. While Begin did not leave personal memoirs or diaries of the peace process, Steinberg and Rubinovitz have tapped into newly released Israeli archives and information housed at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and the Begin Heritage Center. The analysis illuminates the complexities that Menachem Begin faced in navigating between ideology and political realism in the negotiations towards a peace treaty that remains a unique diplomatic achievement.

Many important lessons have come out of the negotiations for the Belfast Agreement. This book explains how public opinion polls were used in support of the Northern Ireland peace process. Significantly, it was the politicians who decided the questions so that they could map out areas of compromise and common ground that their supporters would accept. This book explains how the work was done so that others can apply the benefits of this experience to their own peace building activities.

The participants in the Dartmouth Conference-so named because the first meeting took place at Dartmouth College in 1960-didn't just open up a new level of East-West understanding, they also pioneered a new kind of dialogue between adversaries. They were not government officials, yet their aim was somehow to narrow the divide between the Soviet and American governments-and indeed their peoples. Over the course of more than 40 years, as relationships warmed and trust developed, their dialogue deepened and widened. The ideas and information exchanged between them filtered into public discourse and were channeled into policymaking circles on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The impact of the Dartmouth Conference can never be measured precisely, but it was substantial. As James Voorhees demonstrates, the concept of the multilevel peace process, and especially the idea of sustained dialogue between influential but unofficial members of seemingly implacable groups, evolved as the Dartmouth process evolved. Unfettered by the constraints on official diplomats, the participants could speak with a rare degree of candor and freedom on a wide range of subjects, sustaining their conversation from one meeting to the next and building a foundation of shared knowledge. As Harold Saunders and Vitaly Zhurkin explain in a concluding chapter, the lessons learned and techniques developed at Dartmouth are being applied today in numerous settings. Drawing on extensive research and interviews, this highly readable account of the evolution of a unique peacemaking venture adds a new perspective on both the Cold War and the conduct of multilevel peace processes.