This book examines the complex relationship that exists between the construction of judicial power, and the institutional characteristics of the courts and their regime setting. It examines the intriguing connection between the construction of judicial power on the one hand, and the institutional characteristics of the courts and regime setting on the other. The book asks whether courts are rendered powerful by virtue of their institutional characteristics or by a supportive, perhaps acquiescent, regime setting. By analyzing the historical pathways of courts in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi, this book argues that the emergence of judicial power since the colonial period, though fraught with many challenges, presents a unique opportunity for consolidating democracy. The book examines in detail the significant political decisions of the upper-level courts in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi from the colonial period to the present day, analyzing them in relation to changes in the political environment over time. Analysis of these decisions is also supplemented by in-depth interviews with judges, lawyers and other important stakeholders in the judicial processes. This book demonstrates that even in the most challenging regime environments, effective institutions and determined individuals can push back against interference and issue politically powerful, independent decisions but the way in which judiciaries respond to this regime pressure varies enormously across countries and regions.

It is broadly accepted that an independent and empowered judiciary is central to the rule of law. This dissertation examines the construction of judicial power in emerging democracies through addressing the paradoxical presence of strong judicial power in weak and volatile democracies. I argue that we must unpack our assumptions about democracy and move beyond regime based theories of judicial behavior. I find that existing strategic decision-making theories do not adequately account for the emergence of judicial power in sub-Saharan Africa. Instead this study finds that variation in level of judicial institutionalization or viability accounts for the presence of strong judicial power in weak democracies. A judiciary with a high level of institutional viability is able to withstand the frequent exogenous shocks typically present in sub-Saharan Africa's neopatrimonial regimes.

This book explores the use of foreign judges on courts of constitutional jurisdiction in 9 Pacific states: Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. We often assume that the judges sitting on domestic courts will be citizens. However across the island states of the Pacific, over three-quarters of all judges are foreign judges who regularly hear cases of constitutional, legal and social importance. This has implications for constitutional adjudication, judicial independence and the representative qualities of judges and judiciaries. Drawing together detailed empirical research, legal analysis and constitutional theory, it traces how foreign judges bring different dimensions of knowledge to bear on adjudication, face distinctive burdens on their independence, and hold only an attenuated connection to the state and its people. It shows how foreign judges have come to be understood as representatives of a transnational profession, with its own transferrable judicial skills and values. Foreign Judges in the Pacific sheds light on the widespread but often unarticulated assumptions about the significance of nationality to the functions and qualities of constitutional judges. It shows how the nationality of judges matters, not only for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Pacific courts that use foreign judges, but for legal and theoretical scholarship on courts and judging.

This book argues that independent courts can defend democracy by encouraging political elites to more prudently exercise their powers.

Malcolm Feeley's classic scholarship on courts, criminal justice, legal reform, and the legal complex, examined by law and society scholars.

This second edition examines judicial independence as an aspect of democratization based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence and examines the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. Focusing on the growing authoritarianism in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, the book analyses the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary and the rights bestowed on citizens by post-authoritarian constitutions. Finally, it asks how judicial accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable, independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of judicial studies, democratization and autocratization studies, constitutionalism, global governance, and more broadly comparative government/politics, human rights and comparative public law.

Providing detailed and comprehensive coverage of the transitional justice field, this Research Handbook brings together leading scholars and practitioners to explore how societies deal with mass atrocities after periods of dictatorship or conflict. Situating the development of transitional justice in its historical context, social and political context, it analyses the legal instruments that have emerged.