There’s no question that Americans are bitterly divided by politics. But in Partisans and Partners, Josh Pacewicz finds that our traditional understanding of red/blue, right/left, urban/rural division is too simplistic. Wheels-down in Iowa—that most important of primary states—Pacewicz looks to two cities, one traditionally Democratic, the other traditionally Republican, and finds that younger voters are rejecting older-timers’ strict political affiliations. A paradox is emerging—as the dividing lines between America’s political parties have sharpened, Americans are at the same time growing distrustful of traditional party politics in favor of becoming apolitical or embracing outside-the-beltway candidates. Pacewicz sees this change coming not from politicians and voters, but from the fundamental reorganization of the community institutions in which political parties have traditionally been rooted. Weaving together major themes in American political history—including globalization, the decline of organized labor, loss of locally owned industries, uneven economic development, and the emergence of grassroots populist movements—Partisans and Partners is a timely and comprehensive analysis of American politics as it happens on the ground.

As Washington elites drifted toward ideological poles over the past few decades, did ordinary Americans follow their lead? In The Partisan Sort, Matthew Levendusky reveals that we have responded to this trend—but not, for the most part, by becoming more extreme ourselves. While polarization has filtered down to a small minority of voters, it also has had the more significant effect of reconfiguring the way we sort ourselves into political parties. In a marked realignment since the 1970s—when partisan affiliation did not depend on ideology and both major parties had strong liberal and conservative factions—liberals today overwhelmingly identify with Democrats, as conservatives do with Republicans. This “sorting,” Levendusky contends, results directly from the increasingly polarized terms in which political leaders define their parties. Exploring its far-reaching implications for the American political landscape, he demonstrates that sorting makes voters more loyally partisan, allowing campaigns to focus more attention on mobilizing committed supporters. Ultimately, Levendusky concludes, this new link between party and ideology represents a sea change in American politics.

Partisans and partners -- Keynesianism -- The old families -- The lions of labor -- Politics embedded in community governance: the community leadership party -- Neoliberalism -- The political construction of partnership -- Prairieville's business community in transition -- The Ben Denison campaign: how partners failed to colonize politics -- Neoliberalism (continued): politics disembedded from community -- Governance -- The activist party -- What regular people think -- How Obama won the heartland (thrice) -- Conclusion: the politics of the post-Keynesian society

The idea of responsible partisanship, 1945-1952 -- Democrats and the politics of principle, 1952-1960 -- A choice, not an echo, 1945-1964 -- Power in movement, 1961-1968 -- The age of party reform, 1968-1975 -- The making of a vanguard party, 1969-1980 -- Liberal alliance-building for lean times, 1972-1980 -- Dawn of a new party period, 1980-2000 -- Conclusion polarization without responsibility, 2000-2016

A treatment of party identification, in which three political scientists argue that identification with political parties powerfully determines how citizens look at politics and cast their ballots. They build a case for the continuing theoretical and political significance of partisan identities.

"On January 6 we witnessed what many of us consider a failed insurrection at the US Capitol. But others think this was political violence in service of the preservation of our democracy. When did our political views become extreme? When did guns and violence become a feature of American politics? Nathan Kalmoe and Lily Mason have been researching the increase in radical partisanship in American politics and the associated increasing propensity to support or engage in violence through a series of surveys and survey experiments for several years. Kalmoe and Mason argue that many Americans have become increasingly radical in their identification with their political party and more inclined to view partisans of the other party negatively as people. Their reactions to opposing political views give little room for respect or compromise and make increasing numbers of Americans more likely to either participate in political violence or to view those who do so on behalf of their party favorably. They also find that radical partisans are more apt to be receptive to messages from radical political leaders and less receptive to conflicting information and views. Radical partisanship and political violence are not new to the United States. In most of the 20th century we experienced less radical partisanship, with measures of attitudes towards partisans of other parties that were not as extreme as we see now but this has not been the case throughout much of American history, as witness the fight over slavery that led to the Civil War as well as the violence associated with racism after the fall of reconstruction to the present day"--

The exceptional experiences of South Korea and Taiwan in combining high growth and liberal democracy in a relatively short and similar timetable have brought scholarly attention to their economic and political transformations. This new work looks specifically at the operation of workers and unions in the decades since labor-repressive authoritarian rule ended, bringing Taiwan, in particular, into the literature on comparative labor politics. South Korean labor unions are commonly described as militant and confrontational, for they often take to the streets in raucous protest. Taiwanese unions are seen as moderate and practical, primarily working through formal political processes to lobby their agendas. In exploring how and why these post-democratization states have come to breed such different types of labor politics, Yoonkyung Lee traces the roots of their differences to how unions and political parties operated under authoritarianism, and points to ways in which those legacies continue to be perpetuated. By pairing two cases with many similarities, Lee persuasively uncovers factors that explain the significant variation at play.