Partition theorists argue that when violent ethnic conflict is intense, civil politics cannot be restored unless ethnic groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves. The empirical evidence suggests otherwise.Some theorists of ethnic conflict argue that the physical separation of warring ethnic groups may be the only possible solution to civil war. Without territorial partition and (if needed) forced population movements, they argue, ethnic war cannot end and genocide is likely.Other scholars have counterargued that partition only replaces internal war with international war, creates undemocratic successor states, and generates tremendous human suffering.So far this debate has been informed by few important case studies.Sambanis uses a new set of data on civil wars to identify the main determinants of ethnic partitions and to estimate their impact on the probability of wars recurrence, on low-grade ethnic violence, and on the political institutions of successor states.Sambanis's analysis is the first large-sample quantitative analysis of the subject, testing the propositions of partition theory and weighing heavily on the side of its critics.He shows that almost all the assertions of partition theorists fail to pass rigorous empirical tests.He finds that, on average, partition does not significantly reduce the probability of new violence. A better strategy might be to combine ethnic groups, but most important is to establish credible and equitable systems of governance.It is also important not to load the strategy with subjective premises about the necessity of ethnically pure states and about the futility of interethnic cooperation.This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the economics of civil wars. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

This book examines whether partition is an effective means to resolve ethnic and sectarian civil wars. It argues that partition is unlikely to end ongoing ethnosectarian civil wars, but it can increase the likelihood of preventing civil war recurrence, as long as the partition separates civilians and militaries. The book presents in-depth case studies of Georgia–Abkhazia and Moldova–Transnistria, in addition to cross-national comparisons of all ethnosectarian civil wars between 1945 and 2004. This analysis demonstrates when partitioning a country can help transform an identity-based civil war into a lasting peace. Highlighting practical and moral challenges of separating ethnosectarian groups, the book contends that complete partitions cannot be easily implemented by the international community, and this limits their applicability. It also demonstrates that ethnosectarian civil wars are driven less by inter-group antagonisms and more by state breakdown, meaning displaced minorities can reintegrate peacefully after partition as long as a minimal level of state-building has been completed. The book ends by examining whether partition would be useful for five contemporary conflicts: Iraq, Ukraine–Donbass, Afghanistan, Sudan–South Sudan, and Serbia–Kosovo. This book will be of much interest to students of civil wars, ethnic conflict, peace and conflict studies, and international relations.

What strategies can a government use to end violent ethnic conflicts in the long term? Under what conditions do these strategies work best? Daniel Byman examines how government policies can affect the recurrence of violent ethnic conflict.

Since the end of the Cold War, a series of costly civil wars, many of them ethnic conflicts, have dominated the international security agenda. This volume offers a detailed examination of four recent interventions by the international community.

This paper seeks to answer the question: Under what geographic, demographic, and military conditions is territorial partition more likely to prevent war recurrence between ethnic groups? To answer this question I conducted a qualitative case study of four post-World War II partitions: India/Pakistan (1947), Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh (1994), Cyprus/Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1974), and Moldova/Transnistria (1992). My general finding was that territorial partition is more likely to prevent war recurrence between ethnic groups if it creates a "complete" demographic and territorial separation, defensible borders, and a balance of material power between successor states. However, the cases of Cyprus/TRNC and Moldova/Transnistria suggest that the absence of one factor does not have to spell disaster if the other factors can compensate. In short, since partition theory is based on the concept of the ethnic security dilemma, it follows that partitions should be implemented in a way that actually addresses each group's fear of attack. In this paper I highlight three conditions that can help mitigate the uncertainty that drives the security dilemma. I conclude with a set of recommendations aimed at policy makers who are either considering territorial partition as a conflict resolution strategy, or trying to maintain peace between two newly partitioned territories.

Partition—the physical division of territory along ethno-religious lines into separate nation-states—is often presented as a successful political "solution" to ethnic conflict. In the twentieth century, at least three new political entities—the Irish Free State, the Dominions (later Republics) of India and Pakistan, and the State of Israel—emerged as results of partition. This volume offers the first collective history of the concept of partition, tracing its emergence in the aftermath of the First World War and locating its genealogy in the politics of twentieth-century empire and decolonization. Making use of the transnational framework of the British Empire, which presided over the three major partitions of the twentieth century, contributors draw out concrete connections among the cases of Ireland, Pakistan, and Israel—the mutual influences, shared personnel, economic justifications, and material interests that propelled the idea of partition forward and resulted in the violent creation of new post-colonial political spaces. In so doing, the volume seeks to move beyond the nationalist frameworks that served in the first instance to promote partition as a natural phenomenon.