Brian G. Slocum s "Ordinary Meaning "offers an extended legal-linguistic analysis of the eponymous interpretive doctrine. A centuries-old consensus exists among courts and legal scholars that words in legal texts should be interpreted in light of accepted standards of communication. Therefore the questions of what makes some meaning the ordinary one, and how the determinants of ordinary meaning are identified and conceptualized, are of crucial importance to the interpretation of legal texts. Arguing against reliance on acontextual dictionary definitions, "Ordinary Meaning" rigorously explores the contributions that specific context makes to meaning, along with linguistic phenomena such as indexicals and quantifiers. Slocum provides a theory and a robust general framework for how the determinants of ordinary meaning should be identified and developed."

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the case of Corbett v Corbett, a landmark in terms of law’s engagement with sexual identity, marriage, and transgender rights. The judgement was handed down in 1970, but the decision has shaped decades of debate about the law’s control and recognition of non-normative gender identities. The decision in this case – that the marriage between the Hon. Arthur Corbett and April Ashley was void on the grounds that April Ashley had been born male – has been profoundly influential across the common law world, and came as a dramatic and intolerant intervention in developing discussions about the relationships between medicine, law, questions of sex versus gender, and personal identity. The case raises fundamental questions concerning law in its historical and intellectual context, in particular relating to the centrality of ordinary language for legal interpretation, and this book will be of interest to students and scholars of language and law, legal history, gender and sexuality.

"Ordinary Things and Their Extraordinary Meaning provides a new look at the everyday relationship between psychological processes and extraordinary aspects of ordinary phenomena. Why should we deal with ordinary things? People's life is made of everyday practical, taken-for-granted things, such as driving a car, using money, listening music, etc. When you drive from home to workplace, you are migrating between contexts. Is this an empty space you are crossing, or the time you spend into the car is something meaningful? In psychological terms, things have, at least, three levels of existence, a material, a symbolic and an affective one. The underlying idea is that the symbolic elaboration of everyday things is characterized by the transcendence of the particular object-sign, leading to the creation of more and more complex sign fields. These fields expand according to an inclusive logic up to dialogically and dialectically incorporate opposites (i.e., clean/dirty, transparent/opaque, hide/show, join/divide, slow/fast, etc.). Even the meaning of 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary’ follow such an inclusive logic. If you give a positive value to ordinary, extraordinary is rule-breaking; otherwise, if ordinary means trivial, extraordinary assumes a positive value. Besides, things are cultural artifacts mediating the experience of the world, the psychological processes and the construction of mind. Reflecting upon 'things' is thus a more meaningful pathway to understand Psyche." -- back cover.

There is a long-standing judicial commitment to interpreting language in legal texts according to its 'ordinary meaning'. That is, courts have uniformly agreed that words in legal texts should be interpreted in light of accepted standards of communication. The constituent question of what makes some meaning the ordinary one and the evidential question of how the determinants of ordinary meaning are identified and conceptualized are thus of crucial importance to the interpretation of legal texts. Yet, beyond very general characterizations or assumptions that the answers are self-evident, neither the constituent nor the evidential question has been comprehensively examined by courts or commentators. The process used by courts for determining the ordinary meaning of texts, such as significant reliance on dictionaries, often does not result in interpretations that reflect the ordinary meaning of the textual language, or only coincidentally does so. One main flaw in the judiciary's approach is a failure to properly consider context. Certainly, there is a tension between the inherent requirement of ordinary meaning that it be generalizable across contexts and the reality that meaning is inherently contextual. A significant aspect of framing the ordinary meaning inquiry, and considering arguments about it, therefore involves considering the contribution that context makes to meaning. One way to capture generalizable meanings is to conceive of ordinary meaning as being primarily based on semantic meaning. Further, a distinction between 'narrow context' and 'wide context' can be made, with ordinary meaning being determined on the basis of consideration of facts from the 'narrow context'. In addition, one marked feature of interpretive principles is that they consistently serve to restrict the domains of legal texts, thereby creating a gap between literal meaning and ordinary meaning. Yet framing ordinary meaning as being primarily based on semantic meaning, determined from consideration of 'narrow context', does not eliminate interpretive discretion. When context is considered, the assignment of meaning invariably has an ineliminable element of interpreter discretion. This is true with respect to indexicals and quantifiers, as well as other linguistic phenomena. Nevertheless, focusing on the systematicities of language can narrow the range of interpretive discretion and improve the judiciary's determination of ordinary meaning.

A legal scholar offers a bold new framework for legal interpretation with this “deep, thoughtful, and useful examination . . . of legal meaning” (William Eskridge, Yale University). Consider a criminal sentencing provision that calls for enhanced punishment if a defendant “uses” a firearm during a drug crime. Has a defendant violated the provision if he trades a gun for drugs? Did he “use” the gun in the intended sense? This sort of question is at the heart of legal interpretation. Legal interpretation typically follows the doctrine of “ordinary meaning” —which is to say that words in legal texts should be interpreted in light of accepted standards of communication. Yet often, courts fail to properly consider context, refer to unsuitable dictionary definitions, or otherwise misconceive how the ordinary meaning of words should be determined. In this book, Brian Slocum argues for a new method of interpretation by asking glaring, yet largely ignored, questions. What makes one particular meaning the “ordinary” one, and how exactly do courts conceptualize the elements of ordinary meaning? Ordinary Meaning provides a much-needed reassessment of how the components of ordinary meaning should properly be identified and developed in our modern legal system.

The book provides a new look at the everyday relationship between psychological processes and extraordinary aspects of ordinary phenomena. Why should we deal with ordinary things? People’s life is made of everyday practical, taken-for-granted things, such as driving a car, using money, listening music, etc. When you drive from home to workplace, you are migrating between contexts. Is this an empty space you are crossing, or the time you spend into the car is something meaningful? In psychological terms, things have, at least, three levels of existence, a material, a symbolic and an affective one. The underlying idea is that the symbolic elaboration of everyday things is characterized by the transcendence of the particular object-sign, leading to the creation of more and more complex sign fields. These fields expand according to an inclusive logic up to dialogically and dialectically incorporate opposites (i.e. clean/dirty, transparent/opaque, hide/ show, join/divide, slow/fast, etc.). Even the meaning of “ordinary” and “extraordinary” follow such an inclusive logic: if you give a positive value to ordinary, extraordinary is rule-breaking; otherwise, if ordinary means trivial, extraordinary assumes a positive value. Besides, things are cultural artifacts mediating the experience of the world, the psychological processes and the construction of mind. Reflecting upon “things” is thus a more meaningful pathway to understand Psyche.

The rules of treaty interpretation codified in the 'Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' now apply to virtually all treaties, in an international context as well as within national legal systems, where treaties have an impact on a large and growing range of matters. The rules of treaty interpretation differ somewhat from typical rules for interpreting legal instruments and legislation within national legal systems. Lawyers, administrators, diplomats, and officials at international organisations are increasingly likely to encounter issues of treaty interpretation which require not only knowledge of the relevant rules of interpretation, but also how these rules have been, and are to be, applied in practice. Since the codified rules of treaty interpretation came into decree, there is a considerable body of case-law on their application. This case-law, combined with the history and analysis of the rules of treaty interpretation, provides a basis for understanding this most important task in the application of treaties internationally and within national systems of law. Any lawyer who ever has to consider international matters, and increasingly any lawyer whose work involves domestic legislation with any international connection, is at risk nowadays of encountering a treaty provision which requires interpretation, whether the treaty provision is explicitly in issue or is the source of the relevant domestic legislation. This fully updated new edition features case law from a broader range of jurisdictions, and an account of the work of the International Law Commission in its relation to interpretative declarations. This book provides a guide to interpreting treaties properly in accordance with the modern rules.