In One World Emerging? Alex Inkeles clarifies the meaning of convergence in the social organization of modern societies, shows how it can be measured, and illustrates in detail the manner and degree of convergence across national boundaries. Inkeles assesses the extent to which convergence in institutional patterns is reflected in the emergence of more common attitudes, values, and daily behaviors in different national populations as individuals and communities engage with and respond to the standardizing pressures of national development and global modernization. One popular image of the probable condition of humanity in the twenty-first century anticipates a new Armageddon with all the great civilizations at war with each other. This model neglects a less dramatic but deeper-seated process of worldwide change in which national economic and political systems become more alike and populations worldwide come to adopt similar lifestyles and develop similar attitudes and values for daily living. Alex Inkeles penetrating analysis focuses on this process of convergence.In One World Emerging? Inkeles clarifies the meaning of convergence in the social organization of modern societies, shows how it can be measured, and illustrates in detail the manner and degree of convergence across national boundaries. Sensitive to evidence counter to the main trend, he gives close attention to the many instances in which national differences persist and nations and their populations diverge from a common path.At the national level, he compares and contrasts the modernization of the United States, Russia, China, and India. Focusing on particularly important institutions, he reviews the process of convergence in prestige hierarchies, the family, education, and communications. Capping the enterprise, Inkeles assesses the extent to which convergence in institutional patterns is reflected in the emergence of more common attitudes, values, and daily behaviors in different national populations as individuals and communitiesin North America, Europe, and increasingly in Asiaengage with and respond to the standardizing pressures of national development and global modernization.

This book uncovers the basic contradictions between contemporary China's complex ideological marketplace and Western liberalism. It describes and puts into critical context three versions of Western liberalism (those of F. A. Hayek, John Rawls, and John Dunn), three versions of Chinese liberalism (those of Yang Kuo-shu, Li Qiang, and Ambrose Y.C. King), two versions of modern Confucian humanism (those of T'ang Ch, n-i, and Henry K.H. Woo), and various versions of Chinese Marxism, including Kao Li-k'o's in the early 1990s and some of the recent New Left writings. It shows that all these Chinese political theories, not only Chinese Marxism, depend on a number of premises at odds with Western liberalism, especially epistemological optimism and an extravagantly optimistic concept of political practicability. It also argues that not only these Chinese theories but also Western liberalism have failed to offer adequate normative guidelines for the improvement of political life. This study combines a deep understanding of the history of Chinese thought with a strong grasp of modern philosophical trends and an innovative methodology for the description and criticism of political theories. It will be useful to students of modern Chinese intellectual history, of political philosophy, of political culture, of the comparative study of cultures, and of U.S.-Chinese relations.

This book is a collection of notable papers from the first six volumes of the journal Comparative Sociology. Its content represents leading-edge and contemporarily astute analyses in the burgeoning science of comparative sociology, especially relevant to a globalizing world in transition. Given that not everyone is acquainted with comparative sociology, this book offers an opportunity to enlighten readers unfamiliar with the discipline about the importance of comparative sociology to the new world order. Taken together, the articles illuminate various aspects of comparative sociology—theoretical, methodological, substantive. Some compare social entities in subjective, case-study fashion, while others report on rigorous social research. All contribute in one form or another to describing the many and varied facets of the exciting “new” science of comparative sociology. Contributors are Margit Bussmann, Cristina Corduneanu-Huci, Mattei Dogan, Janet Harkness, Kristen R. Heimdal, Sharon K. Houseknecht, Ho-fung Hung, Ronald Inglehart, Valeriy Khmelko, Melvin L. Kohn, Robert M. Marsh, Peter Ph. Mohler, Pippa Norris, John R. Oneal, Noriko Onodera, Maryjane Osa, Vladimir I. Paniotto, Masamichi Sasaki, Shalom H. Schwartz, Tom W. Smith, Indra de Soysa, Tatsuzo Suzuki, Erich Weede, Brigitte Weiffen, and Masato Yoneda. The content of this volume has previously been published in Comparative Sociology volumes 1 – 6.3.

The economic growth of emerging markets has been unparalleled in recent history, accounting for 50 per cent of global economic output. Despite this reality, this much-needed Handbook is the first contemporary book on human resource management (HRM) res

It is a wide-spread belief that the cultural background inhered in a society affects the requirements of economic development. This relationship requires theoretical and empirical justification. The present book provides this together with an analysis of the development of cultural background itself. Cultural background is embodied in political institutions, in transactions, knowledge, incentives, in social capital, even in the tangibles of the economy. Thus, economic development is shaped and the rate of growth is affected. Conversely, economic development affects cultural background. When this interaction takes place at a non-developmental cultural background level, which is associated with low growth rates, then a growth trap is formed. Within such a growth trap, economic policy (public and monetary) is relatively deactivated and the conditions influencing the change in cultural background and its timing are of primary importance.

The regional trade governance architecture is in flux. The latest wave of regionalism in the form of mega-regional trade partnerships between countries with major shares of the world economy occurred in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. The most systematically important mega-FTAs included the Trans-Pacific Partnership led by the United States (US), the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union (EU) and the US. Drawing on policy diffusion and competitive regionalism literatures, Xianbai Ji develops an innovative model of competitive spill-over to uncover the historical and contemporary sources of mega-regionalism resulting from a temporal clustering of mega-FTA initiatives from great powers. In the book, mega-FTA is conceptualised as an instrument of geo-economic competition between the US, China, and the EU. Each aspired to leverage its mega-FTA to gain an edge over its rivals in economic, geopolitical, and legal terms. Through a mix-method research strategy involving computable general equilibrium modelling, game theory, desk research, and perception survey, Ji generates an impressive chorus of quantitative, qualitative, and perceptual data demonstrating that the rise of mega-regionalism was driven by the multidimensional competition between the US, China, and the EU over international economic benefits, geopolitical influence, and the authority to write rules governing emerging trade issues. This book will attract academics, think tankers, practitioners, and postgraduate students interested in regionalism, international trade, international political economy, applied trade policy analysis, great power competition, geo-economics, and international relations.

The end of the Cold War gave rise to much talk of a 'new' global order and debate about just how new or orderly it was and would be. Attempts to analyse the nature of this order have been many and various. This important new text assesses the main approaches and offers its own analysis arguing that, while chaos and raw anarchy are not on the cards, each of the major domains of power - security, economics, institutions and values - contains elements of potentially major instability. Interstate war may be receding, but there are no simple solutions to comprehensive violent conflict inside fragile states, and the non-democratic great powers continue to have major regional ambitions. There is a global liberal market economy, but it is increasingly unequal and its financial infrastructure remains fragile and crisis-prone. There is a comprehensive set of international institutions but they are rather weak and in need of reform. Liberal values are nominally endorsed by most states but they are in internal conflict and make up no firm basis for a stable world order. Finally, world order is threatened from within because the social compacts, political infrastructures, and national economic capacities of many states will decline. This will have negative consequences for the willingness to bring about effective global governance. The result may be a destructive dynamic which might take us towards a Hobbesian world in ways which Hobbes himself had never imagined.