Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. "More Than Merely Equal Consideration"? -- 2. Prescriptivity and Redundancy -- 3. Looking for a Range Property -- 4. Power and Scintillation -- 5. A Religious Basis for Equality? -- 6. The Profoundly Disabled as Our Human Equals -- Index

This enlightening inquiry into the nature of human equality reveals the vital importance of this basic Western principle—“an important new book” (Robert B. Reich, New York Times Book Review). An enduring theme of Western philosophy is that we are all one another’s equals. Yet the principle of basic equality is woefully under-explored in modern moral and political philosophy. In a major new work, Jeremy Waldron attempts to remedy that shortfall with a subtle and multifaceted account of the basis for the West’s commitment to human equality. Waldron argues that there is no single characteristic that serves as the basis of equality. Instead, the case for moral equality rests on four capacities that all humans have the potential to possess in some degree: reason, autonomy, moral agency, and the ability to love. But how should we regard the differences that people display on these various dimensions? Waldron, who has specialized in the nature of equality for many years, confronts these questions and others fully and unflinchingly. Based on the Gifford Lectures that he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 2015, One Another’s Equals takes Waldron’s thinking further and deeper than ever before.

That all human beings are one another's moral equals is taken by many to be the fundamental premise of contemporary moral, political and legal theory. It is also the demand of individuals and groups to be treated as equals that drives much of political practice and protest today. However, what does such a claim of 'basic equality' between human beings mean? How can it possibly be true, given that we are unequals in almost every other aspect of our lives? And, who, exactly, is meant to fall within its scope? This volume brings together leading thinkers on basic equality to address these questions. Collectively, they explore the concept of equality in history and criticism, analysing and presenting solutions to the most pressing challenges that have been raised against the principle.

L. Nandi Theunissen develops a non-Kantian account of the value of human beings. Against the Kantian tradition, in which humanity is absolutely valuable and unlike the value of anything else, Theunissen outlines a relational proposal according to which our value is continuous with the value of other valuable things. She takes the Socratic starting point that good is affecting, and more particularly, that good is a notion of benefit. If people are bearers of value, the proposal is that our value is no exception. Theunissen explores the possibility that our value is explained through reciprocal relations, or relations of interdependence, as when—as daughters, or teachers, or friends—we benefit others by being part or constitutive of relationships with them. She also investigates the possibility that we can be said to stand in a valuable relationship with ourselves. Ultimately, in The Value of Humanity, she proposes that people are of value because we are constituted in such a way that we can be good for ourselves in the sense that we are able to lead flourishing lives. Intuitively, a person matters because she matters to herself in a very particular sort of way; to appropriate a phrase, she is a being for whom her life can be an issue.

"The book includes introductions, terminology and biographical notes, bibliography, and an index and glossary" --from book jacket.