This paper considers trading environments in which buyers are privately informed about their valuations and sellers are privately informed about the expected value of outside trading opportunities. Outside opportunities are stochastic, however, and future realized shocks may make bilateral trade between a buyer and a seller inefficient. In this environment, there is a role for using liquidated damage clauses as a screening device in optimal contracts, whether designed by the seller, designed by the buyer or designed by a third-party. In all such design settings, liquidated damages are set below the buyer's valuation. Excessive liquidated damage clauses are never optimal in this trading environment and may be a symptom of another contracting distortion or failure. These findings provide a partial rationalization for why courts may strike down liquidated damage clauses when they are excessive, but not when they are insufficient to compensate the harmed party.

Covering over one-hundred topics on issues ranging from Law and Neuroeconomics to European Union Law and Economics to Feminist Theory and Law and Economics, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics is the definitive work in the field of law and economics. The book gathers together scholars and experts in law and economics to create the most inclusive and current work on law and economics. Edited by Francisco Parisi, the Handbook looks at the origins of the field of law and economics, tracks its progression and increased importance to both law and economics, and looks to the future of the field and its continued development by examining a cornucopia of fields touched by work in law and economics. The uniqueness of its breadth, depth, and convenience make the volume essential to scholars, students, and contributors in the field of law and economics.

What effects do laws have? Do individuals drive more cautiously, clear ice from sidewalks more diligently, and commit fewer crimes because of the threat of legal sanctions? Do corporations pollute less, market safer products, and obey contracts to avoid suit? And given the effects of laws, which are socially best? Such questions about the influence and desirability of laws have been investigated by legal scholars and economists in a new, rigorous, and systematic manner since the 1970s. Their approach, which is called economic, is widely considered to be intellectually compelling and to have revolutionized thinking about the law. In this book Steven Shavell provides an in-depth analysis and synthesis of the economic approach to the building blocks of our legal system, namely, property law, tort law, contract law, and criminal law. He also examines the litigation process as well as welfare economics and morality. Aimed at a broad audience, this book requires neither a legal background nor technical economics or mathematics to understand it. Because of its breadth, analytical clarity, and general accessibility, it is likely to serve as a definitive work in the economic analysis of law.

The Economic Impact Group (EIG) was created to support the work on the DCFR with insights from law and economics. It brings together a number of leading European law and economics scholars. The Group looked at the main elements of the DCFR with two questions in mind: from an economic perspective, is it sensible to harmonize private law across Europe for this specific element, and is the solution chosen in the DCFR optimal? This book presents the outcome of the work of the EIG. It deals with key issues such as the function of contract law, contract formation, good faith, non-discrimination, specific performance versus damages, standard contractual terms and consumer protection in contract law. The EIG complements the work of the drafters of the DCFR with insightful and critical assessments, based on the well-established law and economics literature.

The Field of Public Economics has been changing rapidly in recent years, and the sixteen chapters contained in this Handbook survey many of the new developments. As a field, Public Economics is defined by its objectives rather than its techniques and much of what is new is the application of modern methods of economic theory and econometrics to problems that have been addressed by economists for over two hundred years. More generally, the discussion of public finance issues also involves elements of political science, finance and philosophy. These connections are evidence in several of the chapters that follow. Public Economics is the positive and normative study of government's effect on the economy. We attempt to explain why government behaves as it does, how its behavior influences the behavior of private firms and households, and what the welfare effects of such changes in behavior are. Following Musgrave (1959) one may imagine three purposes for government intervention in the economy: allocation, when market failure causes the private outcome to be Pareto inefficient, distribution, when the private market outcome leaves some individuals with unacceptably low shares in the fruits of the economy, and stabilization, when the private market outcome leaves some of the economy's resources underutilized. The recent trend in economic research has tended to emphasize the character of stabilization problems as problems of allocation in the labor market. The effects that government intervention can have on the allocation and distribution of an economy's resources are described in terms of efficiency and incidence effects. These are the primary measures used to evaluate the welfare effects of government policy.