Is over-optimism about a country's future growth perspective good for an economy, or does over-optimism also come with costs? In this paper we provide evidence that recessions, fiscal problems, as well as Balance of Payment-difficulties are more likely to arise in countries where past growth expectations have been overly optimistic. To examine this question, we look at the medium-run effects of instances of over-optimism or caution in IMF forecasts. To isolate the causal effect of over-optimism we take an instrumental variables approach, where we exploit variation provided by the allocation of IMF Mission Chiefs across countries. As a necessary first step, we document that IMF Mission Chiefs tend to systematically differ in their individual degrees of forecast-optimism or caution. The mechanism that transforms over-optimism into a later recession seems to run through higher debt accumulation, both public and private. Our findings illustrate the potency of unjustified optimism and underline the importance of basing economic forecasts upon realistic medium-term prospects.

Is over-optimism about a country's future growth perspective good for an economy, or does over-optimism also come with costs? In this paper we provide evidence that recessions, fiscal problems, as well as Balance of Payment-difficulties are more likely to arise in countries where past growth expectations have been overly optimistic. To examine this question, we look at the medium-run effects of instances of over-optimism or caution in IMF forecasts. To isolate the causal effect of over-optimism we take an instrumental variables approach, where we exploit variation provided by the allocation of IMF Mission Chiefs across countries. As a necessary first step, we document that IMF Mission Chiefs tend to systematically differ in their individual degrees of forecast-optimism or caution. The mechanism that transforms over-optimism into a later recession seems to run through higher debt accumulation, both public and private. Our findings illustrate the potency of unjustified optimism and underline the importance of basing economic forecasts upon realistic medium-term prospects.

We analyze the causes of the apparent bias towards optimism in growth forecasts underpinning the design of IMF-supported programs, which has been documented in the literature. We find that financial variables observable to forecasters are strong predictors of growth forecast errors. The greater the expansion of the credit-to-GDP gap in the years preceding a program, the greater its over-optimism about growth over the next two years. This result is strongest among forecasts that were most optimistic, where errors are also increasing in the economy’s degree of liability dollarization. We find that the inefficient use of financial information applies to growth forecasts more broadly, including the IMF’s forecasts in the World Economic Outlook and those produced by professional forecasters compiled by Consensus Economics. We conclude that improved macrofinancial analysis represents a promising avenue for reducing over-optimism in growth forecasts.

Is over-optimism about a country's future growth perspective good for an economy, or does over-optimism also come with costs? In this paper we provide evidence that recessions, fiscal problems, as well as Balance of Payment-difficulties are more likely to arise in countries where past growth expectations have been overly optimistic. To examine this question, we look at the medium-run effects of instances of over-optimism or caution in IMF forecasts. To isolate the causal effect of over-optimism we take an instrumental variables approach, where we exploit variation provided by the allocation of IMF Mission Chiefs across countries. As a necessary first step, we document that IMF Mission Chiefs tend to systematically differ in their individual degrees of forecast-optimism or caution. The mechanism that transforms over-optimism into a later recession seems to run through higher debt accumulation, both public and private. Our findings illustrate the potency of unjustified optimism and underline the importance of basing economic forecasts upon realistic medium-term prospects.

Economic theory offers several explanations as to why shifting expectations about future economic activity affect current demand. Abstracting from whether changes in expectations originate from swings in beliefs or fundamentals, we test empirically whether more optimistic or pessimistic potential output forecasts trigger short-term fluctuations in private consumption and investment. Relying on a dataset of actual data and forecasts for 89 countries over the 1990-2022 period, we find that private economic agents learn from different sources of in- formation about future potential output growth, and adjust their current demand accordingly over the two years following the shock in expectations. To provide a theoretical foundation to the empirical analysis, we also propose a simple Keynesian model that highlights the role of expectations about long-term output in determining short-term economic activity.

Inhaltsangabe:Introduction: Economic theory normally focuses on rational agents optimizing individual utility. Since the second half of the 20th century, this viewpoint has been enriched by findings from the field of psychology. A new trait of research was created called behavioral economics . It takes into account subjective characteristics such as asymmetric preference and judgment, or limits of rational processing, willpower, and greed. This paper aims to give an overview of two related human traits that have attracted particularly wide interest, namely overconfidence and overoptimism. The two are closely related to each other, and often used synonymously. Broadly speaking, overconfidence results in underestimation of future risks, e.g. the riskiness of future cash flows, whilst overoptimism leads to an overestimation of future positive outcomes, e.g. the future returns of a company. Besides, the paper wants to deduct suggestions for further research, by systematically identifying uncovered topics in existing literature. Usually Alpert and Raiffa are credited with the first discovery of overconfidence. However, the most influential study is probably Russo and Schoemaker. It was published in the Sloan Management Review and communicated the topic to a broader audience for the first time. In particular, it revealed that assumingly rational managers were prone to overconfidence, too. This challenged traditional management doctrines and generated interest in a better understanding of the topic and further research. To exemplify overconfidence, Russo and Schoemaker asked managers to give numerical intervals for ten general-knowledge questions, such that nine out of the ten answers would be correct. On average participants included the correct value within their interval only 5 out of 10 times, i.e. they underestimated potential errors in their estimations. Svenson is probably the most influential source regarding overoptimism. He made the subject intuitively understandable and established a standard measurement method that could be easily used for subsequent research. To give an example of overoptimism: Svenson asked students to compare their driving skills to those of their classmates. Roughly 80% believed they belonged to the top 50%, i.e. they overestimated their abilities. This paper also provides a closer look at the empirical methods normally applied in field studies. Although the phenomena are intuitively understandable, empirical research [...]

Are IMF growth forecasts systematically optimistic? And if so, what is the role of planned policy adjustments on this outcome? Are program forecasts as biased as surveillance forecasts? We try to answer these questions using a comprehensive database on IMF forecasts of economic growth in surveillance and program cases during 2003–2017. We find that large planned fiscal and external adjustments are associated with optimistic growth projections, with significant non-linearities for both program and surveillance cases. Specifically, we find evidence that larger planned fiscal adjustment is associated with higher growth optimism in IMF non-concessional, non-precautionary financial arrangements. Our results show the tendency for optimism has persisted in the period after the Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, the strong correlation between the magnitude of the optimism and expected fiscal consolidation provides a cautionary signal for the post-COVID IMF projections as countries embark on a path of fiscal adjustment.