On Optimal Non-linear Taxation and Public Good Provision in Overlapping Generations Economy
Title | On Optimal Non-linear Taxation and Public Good Provision in Overlapping Generations Economy PDF eBook |
Author | Jukka Pirttilä |
Publisher | |
Pages | 20 |
Release | 1999 |
Genre | |
ISBN | 9789515612847 |
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On Optimal Non-Linear Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Overlapping Generations Economy
Title | On Optimal Non-Linear Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Overlapping Generations Economy PDF eBook |
Author | Jukka Pirttila |
Publisher | |
Pages | |
Release | 2014 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Using the self-selection approach to tax analysis within an OLG framework, the paper examines optimal non-linear labour and capital income taxation and the provision of a durable public good. Under endogenous wages, the marginal tax rules depend on the influence of the tax instruments on self-selection and on the income earning abilities of the households. In particular, we found that production inefficiency occurs in the model, justifying capital income taxation. For the public good, the paper derives a dynamic analogue of the second-best Samuelson rule, encompassing both inter- and intragenerational redistributive considerations. Furthermore, the usual conditions guaranteeing the efficiency of the first-best Samuelson rule are not sufficient in the present model.
Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes in an Overlapping Generations Model
Title | Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes in an Overlapping Generations Model PDF eBook |
Author | Weizhen Hu |
Publisher | |
Pages | 0 |
Release | 2023 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
This study develops an income tax competition framework in an overlapping generations economy and examines the economic impact of labor market integration. With two types of labor possessing varied ability levels and a perfectly mobile capital stock, local governments compete for labor and choose the optimal income taxes to maximize social welfare. We demonstrate that public goods can be either over- or under-provided and discuss the equity and efficiency of the optimal policy rules under a nonlinear income taxation scheme. Further, we compare the equilibrium to linear taxation and demonstrate that nonlinear taxation is not necessarily more “equal” or “effective” than linear taxation. Moreover, we compare the equilibrium to that of the classic static model, and find that the nonlinear optimal tax rates could be above or below the first-best tax level in both dynamic and static models, while the public goods can be either over- or under-provided in the dynamic framework but are always under-provided in the static framework.
Optimal Taxation and Provision of Public Goods with Non Linear Income and Linear Commodity Taxes in a Two Class Economy
Title | Optimal Taxation and Provision of Public Goods with Non Linear Income and Linear Commodity Taxes in a Two Class Economy PDF eBook |
Author | Mario Nava |
Publisher | |
Pages | 25 |
Release | 1993 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Inequality and Optimal Redistribution
Title | Inequality and Optimal Redistribution PDF eBook |
Author | Hannu Tanninen |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Pages | |
Release | 2019-04-30 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN | 1108654819 |
From the 1980s onward income inequality increased in many advanced countries. It is very difficult to account for the rise in income inequality using the standard labour supply/demand explanation. Fiscal redistribution has become less effective in compensating increasing inequalities since the 1990s. Some of the basic features of redistribution can be explained through the optimal tax framework developed by J.A. Mirrlees in 1971. This Element surveys some of the earlier results in linear and nonlinear taxation and produces some new numerical results. Given the key role of capital income in the overall income inequality it also considers the optimal taxation of capital income. It examines empirically the relationship between the extent of redistribution and the components of the Mirrlees framework. The redistributive role of factors such as publicly provided private goods, public employment, endogenous wages in the overlapping generations model and income uncertainty are analysed.
Optimal Nonlinear Redistributive Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Economy with Veblen Effects
Title | Optimal Nonlinear Redistributive Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Economy with Veblen Effects PDF eBook |
Author | Luca Micheletto |
Publisher | |
Pages | 23 |
Release | 2009 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
This paper deals with the consequences of the assumption of negatively interdependent preferences for the shape of the optimal nonlinera income tax and the efficient level of public good provision in a setting where the policy maker maximizes an inequality averse social welfare function and the agents' market ability is private information. The analysis points out that the terms added in the tax formulas due to the presence of Veblen effects might justify a reduction in the optimal marginal tax rates faced by the different individuals. Also, the desirability of negative marginal tax rates cannot de ruled out. With respect to the issue of the optimal level of public good provision, we derive a modified Samuelson rule and highlight the fact that the Veblen-based part of the formula might require to distort downwards the efficient level of public good provision.
Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation
Title | Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation PDF eBook |
Author | Craig Brett |
Publisher | |
Pages | 0 |
Release | 2008 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by their skill levels, who have the same quasilinear preferences for labor supply and the consumption of a private and a public good. Comparative statics are obtained for the weights in a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, the prices of the two goods, a taste parameter that measures the onerousness of working, and the skill levels.