Sir Oliver Franks served as British Ambassador to the US between 1948 and 1952. This analysis reveals a great deal about the condition of relations between Britain and America, the mechanics of co-operation and the impact of a singular individual on international relations.

Sir Oliver Franks served as British Ambassador to the US between 1948 and 1952. This analysis reveals a great deal about the condition of relations between Britain and America, the mechanics of co-operation and the impact of a singular individual on international relations.

Sir Oliver Franks served as British Ambassador to the US between1948 and 1952. This was a seminal period in postwar history, which saw the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the emergence of the Cold War, the signing of ther North Atlantic Treaty, the Korean War and the assimilation of the former enemy powers of Germany (or the western part at least) and Japan into the international system. During these years, Britain was regarded as the principal ally of the US in the east-west confrontation. This gave British policymakers an opportunity to influence both US policy and international developments.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Churchill sought to lead Europe into an integrated union, but just over seventy years later, Britain is poised to vote on leaving the EU. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon here recounts the fascinating history of Britain's uneasy relationship with the European continent since the end of the war. He shows how British views of the United Kingdom's place within Europe cannot be understood outside of the context of decolonization, the Cold War, and the Anglo-American relationship. At the end of the Second World War, Britons viewed themselves both as the leaders of a great empire and as the natural centre of Europe. With the decline of the British Empire and the formation of the European Economic Community, however, Britons developed a Euroscepticism that was inseparable from a post-imperial nostalgia. Britain had evolved from an island of imperial Europeans to one of post-imperial Eurosceptics.

offers a timely, critical examination of Churchill’s contribution to establishing the Anglo-American special relationship in the cold war draws together some of the most established and best emergent scholars in the field will be of much interest to students of Anglo-American relations, Cold War History, foreign policy, international history and IR, in general

With contributions from the most accomplished scholars in the field, this fascinating companion to one of America's pivotal presidents assesses Harry S. Truman as a historical figure, politician, president and strategist. Assembles many of the top historians in their fields who assess critical aspects of the Truman presidency Provides new approaches to the historiography of Truman and his policies Features a variety of historiographic methodologies

Since its founding, the United States has allied with unsavory dictatorships to thwart even more urgent security threats. How well has the United States managed such alliances, and what have been their consequences for its national security? In this book, Evan N. Resnick examines the negotiating tables between the United States and its allies of convenience since World War II and sets forth a novel theory of alliance bargaining. Resnick’s neoclassical realist theory explains why U.S. leaders negotiate less effectively with unfriendly autocratic states than with friendly liberal ones. Since policy makers struggle to mobilize domestic support for controversial alliances, they seek to cast those allies in the most benign possible light. Yet this strategy has the perverse result of weakening leverage in intra-alliance disputes. Resnick tests his theory on America’s Cold War era alliances with China, Pakistan, and Iraq. In all three cases, otherwise hardline presidents bargained anemically on such pivotal issues as China’s sales of ballistic missiles, Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons, and Iraq’s sponsorship of international terrorism. In contrast, U.S. leaders are more inclined to bargain aggressively with democratic allies who do not provoke domestic opposition, as occurred with the United Kingdom during the Korean War. An innovative work on a crucial and timely international relations topic, Allies of Convenience explains why the United States has mismanaged these “deals with the devil”—with deadly consequences.