War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation. Using vast data sets, Lawrence examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight wars by the numbers.

War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation. Using vast data sets, Lawrence examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight wars by the numbers.

The story of the heroic resilience of the Ukrainians against the military forces of a country which has more than three times its population. On 24 February 2022, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, unleashed an attack on Ukraine that developed into the most significant conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Fought over the same ground that the Germans and the Soviet Union battled on between 1941 and 1944, Russia attempted to advance to the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv and replace its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with a puppet regime. Facing determined resistance, the Russians failed to reach the city, being compelled to withdraw and redirect their forces to other fronts. The Battle of Kyiv tells the story of the heroic resilience of the Ukrainians over the military forces of a country which has more than three times its population and an economy almost ten times larger. This book is also an analysis of the enormous support given to Ukraine, both politically and militarily, by NATO and other nations, without which Ukraine’s military might have failed to beat back the invaders. The author explores the first phase of the war, during which Russian armor, mechanized and air mobile troops drove on Kyiv, surrounded Chernigov, seized Kherson twice, and threatened the very existence of the Ukrainian state. The United States’ intelligence services estimated that the Russians would seize Kyiv within three days. They offered to evacuate President Zelensky back to Lvov. His alleged response to the Americans was: ‘I need ammunition, not a ride.’ He and his government stayed in Kyiv and the battle lines were drawn. The Russians continued their offensive. As well as bearing down on Kyiv and Kherson, Putin’s troops also threatened Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov, Mykolaiv, and the beleaguered port city of Mariupol. This book covers all the fighting for these areas up until Russia’s subsequent withdraw from the region around Kyiv. It addresses the military operations on the ground, the destruction of the buildings and the Ukrainian infrastructure, the suffering of the civilian population and the day-by-day struggles for survival. Writing as the battle raged on, the author examines the conflict with an unparalleled immediacy and poignancy. This also means that The Battle of Kyiv is an important historical document, reflecting not subsequent outcomes, but depicting the uncertainty and anxiety faced not just by the contesting forces, but by the rest of the world as the result of the war in Ukraine hung in the balance.

As American and coalition troops fight the first battles of this new century -- from Afghanistan to Yemen to the Philippines to Iraq -- they do so in ways never before seen. Until recently, information war was but one piece of a puzzle, more than a sideshow in war but far less than the sum total of the game. Today, however, we find information war revolutionizing combat, from top to bottom. Gone are the advantages of fortified positions -- nothing is impregnable any longer. Gone is the reason to create an overwhelming mass of troops -- now, troop concentrations merely present easier targets. Instead, stealth, swarming, and "zapping" (precision strikes on individuals or equipment) are the order of the day, based on superior information and lightning-fast decision-making. In many ways, modern warfare is information warfare. Bruce Berkowitz's explanation of how information war revolutionized combat and what it means for our soldiers could not be better timed. As Western forces wage war against terrorists and their supporters, in actions large and small, on several continents, The New Face of War explains how they fight and how they will win or lose. There are four key dynamics to the new warfare: asymmetric threats, in which even the strongest armies may suffer from at least one Achilles' heel; information-technology competition, in which advantages in computers and communications are crucial; the race of decision cycles, in which the first opponent to process and react to information effectively is almost certain to win; and network organization, in which fluid arrays of combat forces can spontaneously organize in multiple ways to fight any given opponent at any time. America's use of networked, elite ground forces, in combination with precision-guided bombing from manned and unmanned flyers, turned Afghanistan from a Soviet graveyard into a lopsided field of American victory. Yet we are not invulnerable, and the same technology that we used in Kuwait in 1991 is now available to anyone with a credit card and access to the Internet. Al Qaeda is adept in the new model of war, and has searched long and hard for weaknesses in our defenses. Will we be able to stay ahead of its thinking? In Iraq, Saddam's army is in no position to defeat its enemies -- but could it defend Baghdad? As the world anxiously considers these and other questions of modern war, Bruce Berkowitz offers many answers and a framework for understanding combat that will never again resemble the days of massive marches on fortress-like positions. The New Face of War is a crucial guidebook for reading the headlines from across our troubled planet.

An overview of offense-defense theory, which argues that the relative ease of offense and defense varies in international politics. Offense-defense theory argues that the relative ease of offense and defense varies in international politics. When the offense has the advantage, military conquest becomes easier and war is more likely; the opposite is true when the defense has the advantage. The balance between offense and defense depends on geography, technology, and other factors. This theory, and the body of related theories, has generated much debate and research over the past twenty-five years.This book presents a comprehensive overview of offense-defense theory. It includes contending views on the theory and some of the most recent attempts to refine and test it.

This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late 1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical events. The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China’s support for its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its ‘Maoist’ organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general.