North Korea is perilously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States and its East Asian allies. Since their first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has struggled to perfect the required delivery systems. Kim Jong-un’s regime now appears to be close, however. Sung Chull Kim, Michael D. Cohen, and the volume contributors contend that the time to prevent North Korea from achieving this capability is virtually over; scholars and policymakers must turn their attention to how to deter a nuclear North Korea. The United States, South Korea, and Japan must also come to terms with the fact that North Korea will be able to deter them with its nuclear arsenal. How will the erratic Kim Jong-un behave when North Korea develops the capability to hit medium- and long-range targets with nuclear weapons? How will and should the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China respond, and what will this mean for regional stability in the short term and long term? The international group of authors in this volume address these questions and offer a timely analysis of the consequences of an operational North Korean nuclear capability for international security.

This book examines the importance of global nuclear order, emphasising the importance of perspective in our understanding of it, and its significance in international politics. Addressing a gap in existing literature, this book provides an introduction to nuclear weapon states and their relationship with the global nuclear order/disorder paradigm. It explores four main themes and aims to: 1. conceptualise the dichotomous paradigm of global nuclear order/disorder; 2. outline the different phases of global nuclear order/disorder from 1945 to present; 3. address the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the wider international nuclear non-proliferation regime; 4. provide an overview of every nuclear weapon state’s national nuclear doctrines throughout the years. The book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies, Cold War studies, foreign policy and IR, more generally.

Written by a leading scholar in the field of nuclear weapons and international relations, this book examines ‘the problem of order’ arising from the existence of weapons of mass destruction. This central problem of international order has its origins in the nineteenth century, when industrialization and the emergence of new sciences, technologies and administrative capabilities greatly expanded states’ abilities to inflict injury, ushering in the era of total war. It became acute in the mid-twentieth century, with the invention of the atomic bomb and the pre-eminent role ascribed to nuclear weapons during the Cold War. It became more complex after the end of the Cold War, as power structures shifted, new insecurities emerged, prior ordering strategies were called into question, and as technologies relevant to weapons of mass destruction became more accessible to non-state actors as well as states. William Walker explores how this problem is conceived by influential actors, how they have tried to fashion solutions in the face of many predicaments, and why those solutions have been deemed effective and ineffective, legitimate and illegitimate, in various times and contexts.

This book examines and compares the political situations in North Korea and Iran, and the contemporary security challenges posed by their illicit nuclear aspirations. While government officials, including a series of American presidents, strategic policy documents and outside analysts have repeatedly noted that North Korea and Iran occupy a similar challenge, the commonality has largely been left unexplored. This book argues that North Korea and Iran are uniquely common in the world today in their illicit nuclear aspirations in violation of their legal commitments made under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The work evaluates alternative arguments, some of which sustain that the two states should be grouped together based on other metrics, such as nuclear powers that sponsor terrorist organizations or nuclear states that violate human rights, and find alternative explanations do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Drawing on newly declassified documents and Iranian and North Korean sources, the book provides a comprehensive and comparative assessment of the two states’ social, historical, economic, and domestic political structures and situation to make these determinations. Furthermore, it reviews the nuclear issue stemming from Iran and North Korea and the efforts to constrain these programs. The book concludes with specific policy recommendations that apply diplomatic lessons learned from dealing with Iran to North Korea and vice versa. This book will be of interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international security, foreign policy and International Relations.

For a state that has gained a global reputation as a violator of international norms, not least through its unwavering pursuit of nuclear weapons, North Korea's determination to become a nuclear-armed state is puzzling. If nuclear weapons beget security, insecurity, and other costs for the state, how might we understand this pursuit, and the delinquent behaviour that has arisen from it? In North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order, Edward Howell offers an answer to this question, focusing on North Korea's quest for status in the international system and developing the theoretical framework of 'strategic delinquency'. Featuring previously unpublished and new interviews with international negotiators with North Korea, and drawing upon new academic literature, Howell proffers an original theoretical framework to apply to the North Korean case. Covering a time period from the 1990s to the present-day, and using unprecedentedly rich empirical evidence, he makes the overarching argument that North Korea has strategically deployed behaviour that breaks international norms in order to reap benefits. In so doing, this book posits how over time, North Korea has learnt that despite the low status and opprobrium that might ensue, bad behaviour can pay.

Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang’s Nuclear North Korea was first published in 2003 amid the outbreak of a lasting crisis over the North Korean nuclear program. It promptly became a landmark of an ongoing debate in academic and policy circles about whether to engage or contain North Korea. Fifteen years later, as North Korea tests intercontinental ballistic missiles and the U.S. president angrily refers to Kim Jong-un as “Rocket Man,” Nuclear North Korea remains an essential guide to the difficult choices we face. Coming from different perspectives—Kang believes the threat posed by Pyongyang has been inflated and endorses a more open approach, while Cha is more skeptical and advocates harsher measures, though both believe that some form of engagement is necessary—the authors together present authoritative analysis of one of the world’s thorniest challenges. They refute a number of misconceptions and challenge the faulty thinking that surrounds the discussion of North Korea, particularly the idea that North Korea is an irrational actor. Cha and Kang look at the implications of a nuclear North Korea, assess recent and current approaches to sanctions and engagement, and provide a functional framework for constructive policy. With a new chapter on the way forward for the international community in light of continued nuclear tensions, this book is of lasting relevance to understanding the state of affairs on the Korean peninsula.

Kim Jong Un and the Bomb tells the story of how North Korea-once derided in the 1970s as a "fourth-rate pipsqueak" of a country by President Richard Nixon-came to credibly threaten the American homeland with a thermonuclear bomb atop an intercontinental-range ballistic missile by November 2017.