The relationship of stock returns and trading volume is the focus of much recent interest. I examine an economic model of a rational trader who operates in a market with transactions costs and noise trading. The level of trading affects the rational trader’s marginal cost of transacting; as a result, trading volume is a source of risk. This engenders an equilibrium relationship between returns and volume. The model also provides a simple way to scrutinize this relationship empirically. Empirical evidence supports the implications of the model.

The relationship of stock returns and trading volume is the focus of much recent interest. I examine an economic model of a rational trader who operates in a market with transactions costs and noise trading. The level of trading affects the rational trader`s marginal cost of transacting; as a result, trading volume is a source of risk. This engenders an equilibrium relationship between returns and volume. The model also provides a simple way to scrutinize this relationship empirically. Empirical evidence supports the implications of the model.

We develop a dynamic model in which traders have differential information about the true value of the risky asset and trade the risky asset with proportional transaction costs. We show that without additional assumption, trading volume can not totally remove the noise in the pricing equation. However, because trading volume increases in the absolute value of noisy per capita supply change, it provides useful information on the asset fundamental value which cannot be inferred from the equilibrium price.We further investigate the relation between trading volume, price autocorrelation, return volatility and proportional transaction costs. Firstly, trading volume decreases in proportional transaction costs and the influence of proportional transaction costs decreases at the margin. Secondly, price autocorrelation can be generated by proportional transaction costs: under no transaction costs, the equilibrium prices at date 1 and 2 are not correlated; however under proportional transaction costs, they are correlated - the higher (lower) the equilibrium price at date 1, the lower (higher) the equilibrium price at date 2. Thirdly, we show that return volatility may be increasing in proportional transaction costs, which is contrary to Stiglitz 1989, Summers amp; Summers 1989's reasoning but is consistent with Umlauf 1993 and Jones amp; Seguin 1997's empirical results.

This study considers the relationship between trading volumes, transactions costs, and the profitability of momentum strategies using data from the UK. We demonstrate that round-trip transactions costs for selling loser firms are around double those of buying winners, and in particular, the costs of selling low volume losers is more than twice as high as the cost of selling low volume winners. By contrast, there are only modest differences between the costs of buying winners and losers, irrespective of their volume levels. Yet we observe that, even in net terms, momentum strategies based on low volume stocks are more profitable than those using high volume stocks. We also note important differences between transactions costs measured using quoted versus effective spreads. Altogether, our findings should sound a word of caution for any study attempting to evaluate the impact of transactions costs on momentum profitability that such costs are very heterogeneous across firms and trade types, implying that they require careful calculation.

We study the impact of Central Bank intervention on the process of price formation in currency markets. We use a unique dataset of tick-by-tick indicative quotes posted by dealers on Reuters terminals and of intraday sterilized spot interventions and customer transactions executed on behalf of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) on the Swiss Franc/U.S. Dollar exchange rate (CHFUSD) between 1986 and 1998. We find that potentially informative SNB interventions (but not ex post uninformative customer transactions), although small relative to daily trading volumes in the CHFUSD market, had significant and persistent (albeit asymmetric, depending on their sign) effects on daily currency returns, especially when (relatively) large in magnitude, expected by the market, or inconsistent with existing momentum. The market did not anticipate the occurrence of incoming interventions un-less if chasing the trend. The SNB was much less successful in smoothing fluctuations of the currency, for daily CHFUSD volatility always surged in proximity of interventions, as did average absolute and proportional spreads. Decomposition of estimated absolute spread shocks also reveals that SNB actions induced misinformation among market participants, impacted trading immediacy, and increased market liquidity and competition among dealers. Many of these changes translated into higher transaction costs borne by the population of investors.