'Because the law of defamation is about reputation and thus necessarily about community and social attitudes, Baker's serious empirical analysis of just those community and social attitudes about defamation and about reputation is a novel and important contribution to the literature on libel and slander. It will be a useful corrective to the various empirically unsupported assertions that dominate the court cases and the academic literature on the topic.' Frederick Schauer, University of Virginia, US 'This book shines a welcome light on a neglected area of defamation law: how juries and judges determine what it means to say a statement is defamatory. The author employs well-designed empirical research to provide concrete answers, and the reform he proposes is sensible and workable. The book should be must-reading for anyone who seeks to understand how the law does or does not protect reputation especially lawyers and judges who try libel cases.' David A. Anderson, University of Texas Law School, US 'When defamation jurors decide whether a statement about someone is "defamatory", the question for them to answer is whether it would generate disapproval among "ordinary reasonable people". It has generally been assumed that they answer this question correctly. What Roy Baker discovered through empirical research is that this assumption may often be wrong. This fascinating and important book sets out his findings, alongside a broad-ranging and perceptive analysis of the law's approach to defining "defamatory".' Michael Chesterman, The University of New South Wales, Australia 'This refreshingly original work is an essential addition to the libraries of all defamation aficionados. Through empirical evidence, including interviews with judges and practitioners, and surveys of the general public, Dr Baker convincingly demonstrates the human propensity to overestimate the negative effect that defamatory imputations may have on other people ("the third person effect"). The conventional "ordinary reasonable person" test becomes in practice an "ordinary unreasonable person" test, regrettably lowering the defamation threshold and further curtailing freedom of communication.' Michael Gillooly, The University of Western Australia The common law determines whether a publication is defamatory by considering how 'ordinary reasonable people' would respond to it. But how does the law work in practice? Who are these 'ordinary reasonable people' and what do they think? This book examines the psychology behind how judges, juries and lawyers decide what is defamatory. Drawing on a thorough examination of case law, as well as extensive empirical research, including surveys involving over 4,000 members of the general public, interviews with judges and legal practitioners and focus groups representing various sections of the community, this book concludes that the law reflects fundamental misperceptions about what people think and how they are influenced by the media. The result is that the law tends to operate so as to unfairly disadvantage publishers, thus contributing to defamation law's infamous 'chilling effect' on free speech. This unique and controversial book will appeal to judges, defamation law practitioners and scholars in various common law jurisdictions, media outlets, academics engaged in researching and teaching torts and media law, as well as those working within the disciplines of media or communications studies and psychology. Anyone concerned with the law's interaction with public opinion, as well as how people interpret the media will find much to interest them in this fascinating study.

An updated edition of the “penetrating study” examining how the current state of mass media puts our democracy at risk (Noam Chomsky). What happens when a few conglomerates dominate all major aspects of mass media, from newspapers and magazines to radio and broadcast television? After all the hype about the democratizing power of the internet, is this new technology living up to its promise? Since the publication of this prescient work, which won Harvard’s Goldsmith Book Prize and the Kappa Tau Alpha Research Award, the concentration of media power and the resultant “hypercommercialization of media” has only intensified. Robert McChesney lays out his vision for what a truly democratic society might look like, offering compelling suggestions for how the media can be reformed as part of a broader program of democratic renewal. Rich Media, Poor Democracy remains as vital and insightful as ever and continues to serve as an important resource for researchers, students, and anyone who has a stake in the transformation of our digital commons. This new edition includes a major new preface by McChesney, where he offers both a history of the transformation in media since the book first appeared; a sweeping account of the organized efforts to reform the media system; and the ongoing threats to our democracy as journalism has continued its sharp decline. “Those who want to know about the relationship of media and democracy must read this book.” —Neil Postman “If Thomas Paine were around, he would have written this book.” —Bill Moyers

A single point of reference on newsgathering, this is the first book to draw together the law and other regulatory rules in this area. Written in the post-Leveson environment, it is an essential resource for all media law specialists.