Neuroscience Without Representations: Building a Brain-in-a-World View describes a non-representational characterization of the brain that also provides an accounting on how humans can rely on symbolic systems and its conditions of application to deal with the representational requirements of human knowledge. Applying an evolutionary perspective to cognition, as well as assuming certain tenets from what is known as “4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition theories), this volume presents arguments to support a non-representational view of the brain while also outlining how non-representational brains can nevertheless be representationally knowledgeable. As both views in isolation have limitations, Dr. Vilarroya takes these ideas in a combined approach that is supported upon detailed analyses of compelling recent studies. Further, this presents a detailed guide on how to implement the alternative notion of neural representation in a research plan. Readers will gain a better understanding of the centrality of the notion of representation in neuroscientific theories and what it means for a brain to represent something, what makes a neural activity a representation, and what is represented. Presents original arguments to support a non-representational view of the brain and outlines how non-representational brains can also be representationally knowledgeable Describes the basics of an alternative to the notion of neural representation Details the reasons underlying the unsuitability of notion of neural representation to address the brain as a cognitive organ Offers detailed analyses of relevant studies from a variety of fields, including cognitive neuroscience, evolutionary biology, behavioral sciences and biological anthropology Provides details to help guide design, implementation and interpretation of empirical studies in this field

Despite our impression of a seamless spatial world, mature human spatial knowledge is composed of sub-systems, each specialized. This book uses the case of Williams syndrome — a rare genetic deficit - to argue for specialization of function in both normal and unusual development. The evidence suggests a speculative hypothesis linking the genetic deficit to changes in the timing of emergence for different sub-systems. More broadly, the book shows the complexity of spatial cognition, its genetic correlates, and realization in the brain.

This volume explores how advances in the fields of evolutionary neuroscience and cognitive psychology are informing media studies with a better understanding of how humans perceive, think and experience emotion within mediated environments. The book highlights interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches to the production and reception of cinema, television, the Internet and other forms of mediated communication that take into account new understandings of how the embodied brain senses and interacts with its symbolic environment. Moreover, as popular media shape perceptions of the promises and limits of brain science, contributors also examine the representation of neuroscience and cognitive psychology within mediated culture.

This carefully designed, multi-authored textbook covers a broad range of theoretical issues in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience. With accessible language, a uniform structure, and many pedagogical features, Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introdution is the best high-level overview of this area for an interdisciplinary readership of students. Written specifically for this volume by experts in their fields who are also experienced teachers, the book’s thirty chapters are organized into the following parts: I. Background Knowledge II. Classical Debates III. Consciousness IV. Crossing Boundaries Each chapter starts with relevant key words and definitions and a chapter overview, then presents historical coverage of the topic, explains and analyzes contemporary debates, and ends with a sketch of cutting edge research. A list of suggested readings and helpful discussion topics conclude each chapter. This uniform, student-friendly design makes it possible to teach a cohort of both philosophy and interdisciplinary students without assuming prior understanding of philosophical concepts, cognitive science, or neuroscience. Key Features: Synthesizes the now decades-long explosion of scientifically informed philosophical research in the study of mind. Expands on the offerings of other textbooks by including chapters on language, concepts and non-conceptual content, and animal cognition. Offers the same structure in each chapter, moving the reader through an overview, historical coverage, contemporary debates, and finally cutting-edge research. Packed with pedagogical features, like defined Key Terms, Suggested Readings, and Discussion Questions for each chapter, as well as a General Glossary. Provides readers with clear, chapter-long introductions to Cognitive Neuroscience, Molecular and Cellular Cognition, Experimental Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysical Issues, and Epistemic Issues.

This eBook contains ten articles on the topic of representation of abstract concepts, both simple and complex, at the neural level in the brain. Seven of the articles directly address the main competing theories of mental representation – localist and distributed. Four of these articles argue – either on a theoretical basis or with neurophysiological evidence – that abstract concepts, simple or complex, exist (have to exist) at either the single cell level or in an exclusive neural cell assembly. There are three other papers that argue for sparse distributed representation (population coding) of abstract concepts. There are two other papers that discuss neural implementation of symbolic models. The remaining paper deals with learning of motor skills from imagery versus actual execution. A summary of these papers is provided in the Editorial.

The second edition of the seminal work in the field—revised, updated, and extended In Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker outline and address the conceptual confusions encountered in various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The result of a collaboration between an esteemed philosopher and a distinguished neuroscientist, this remarkable volume presents an interdisciplinary critique of many of the neuroscientific and psychological foundations of modern cognitive neuroscience. The authors point out conceptual entanglements in a broad range of major neuroscientific and psychological theories—including those of such neuroscientists as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Libet, Penrose, Posner, Raichle and Tononi, as well as psychologists such as Baar, Frith, Glynn, Gregory, William James, Weiskrantz, and biologists such as Dawkins, Humphreys, and Young. Confusions arising from the work of philosophers such as Dennett, Chalmers, Churchland, Nagel and Searle are subjected to detailed criticism. These criticisms are complemented by constructive analyses of the major cognitive, cogitative, emotional and volitional attributes that lie at the heart of cognitive neuroscientific research. Now in its second edition, this groundbreaking work has been exhaustively revised and updated to address current issues and critiques. New discussions offer insight into functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the notions of information and representation, conflict monitoring and the executive, minimal states of consciousness, integrated information theory and global workspace theory. The authors also reply to criticisms of the fundamental arguments posed in the first edition, defending their conclusions regarding mereological fallacy, the necessity of distinguishing between empirical and conceptual questions, the mind-body problem, and more. Essential as both a comprehensive reference work and as an up-to-date critical review of cognitive neuroscience, this landmark volume: Provides a scientifically and philosophically informed survey of the conceptual problems in a wide variety of neuroscientific theories Offers a clear and accessible presentation of the subject, minimizing the use of complex philosophical and scientific jargon Discusses how the ways the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of neuroscientific research Includes fresh insights on mind-body and mind-brain relations, and on the relation between the notion of person and human being Features more than 100 new pages and a wealth of additional diagrams, charts, and tables Continuing to challenge and educate readers like no other book on the subject, the second edition of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is required reading not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also for academics, researchers, and students involved in the study of the mind and consciousness.

Our thoughts are meaningful. We think about things in the outside world; how can that be so? This is one of the deepest questions in contemporary philosophy. Ever since the 'cognitive revolution', states with meaning-mental representations-have been the key explanatory construct of the cognitive sciences. But there is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. Powerful new methods in cognitive neuroscience can now reveal information processing in the brain in unprecedented detail. They show how the brain performs complex calculations on neural representations. Drawing on this cutting-edge research, Nicholas Shea uses a series of case studies from the cognitive sciences to develop a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation. His approach is distinctive in focusing firmly on the 'subpersonal' representations that pervade so much of cognitive science. The diversity and depth of the case studies, illustrated by numerous figures, make this book unlike any previous treatment. It is important reading for philosophers of psychology and philosophers of mind, and of considerable interest to researchers throughout the cognitive sciences.