Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.

Fighting the Fleet recognizes that fleets conduct four distinct but interlocking tasks at the operational level of war--striking, screening, scouting, and basing--and that successful operational art is achieved when they are brought to bear in a cohesive, competitive scheme. In explaining these elements and how they are conjoined for advantage, a central theme emerges: despite the utility and importance of jointness among the armed forces, the effective employment of naval power requires a specialized language and understanding of naval concepts that is often diluted or completely lost when too much jointness is introduced. Woven into the fabric of the book are the fundamental principles of three of the most important naval theorists of the twentieth century: Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, and Captain Wayne Hughes. While Cares and Cowden advocate the reinvigoration of combat theory and the appropriate use of operations research, they avoid over-theorizing and have produced a practical guide that empowers fleet planners to wield naval power appropriately and effectively in meeting today's operational and tactical challenges.

This third edition covers the basic analytical developments in naval search and detection theory over the last fifty years. Accessible to anyone with a mathematical background, it covers analytical decision-making, simulation techniques, and models used in determining the probability of detection.

This major revision updates Wayne Hughes's 1986 landmark study that is credited with providing decision makers a sound foundation for battle planning and tactical thinking. The book integrates the historical evolution of tactics, analysis, and fleet operations, and today it can serve as a primer for anyone who wants to learn how navies fight and win. This second edition includes much new material on combat in the missile age and reflects the reconfiguration of many tactics for littoral operations after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hughes recreates famous battles to show how tactics have changed through the ages and the ways in which they have remained unchanged. He covers tactical interaction between land and sea, the sensory revolution of WWII, secret weapons and maritime surprise, the role in battle of leadership and morale, and the importance of surface warships in today's U.S. fleet. He suggests that naval tactics, unlike ground combat, are dominated by the offense and concludes that the great tactical maxim must be attack effectively first. A new chapter traces the evolution of missile tactics at sea and includes details of attacks on ships. Many changes emphasize joint operations and coastal combat. The already extensive appraisal of command and control and information warfare is further expanded to cover modern naval operations and the character of modern salvo warfare. In the tradition of Mahan and Clauswitz, this classic text incorporates literature, politics, and a knowledge of human nature. Indispensable reading for all those interested in naval tactics, it is also a valuable reference for wargamers

The Navy Operations & Planning SMARTbook outlines the Navy operational-level fundamentals, command, control, and organization. It is also a bridge between the theory of operational art and the practical specific guidance that Navy commanders and staffs require to accomplish their mission. It is prepared to complement existing joint and Navy doctrine and provides a general guide to the application of command at the operational level of war and the staff organization and functionality required to support the operational commander. The U.S. Navy is an instrument of national power, employed to prevent conflict and, if necessary, prevail in war. It is organized, trained and equipped primarily to fight at and from the sea and to influence events on land. Unlike the other components of the joint force, the maritime component routinely conducts operations across all of the domains, described as air, land, maritime, space, and the information environment. *** Find the latest edition of this book and the rest of our series of military reference SMARTbooks at the publishers website: www.TheLightningPress.com ***

An award-winning study of the Franco-American undeclared naval war at the turn of the nineteenth century, this history of the nearly forgotten struggle is filled with the dramatic actions of such frigates as the Constellation and her capture of l'Insurgente, as well as the sundry operations that protected American commerce from the depredations of the French corsairs in the Caribbean. First published in 1987, the book avoids the parochialism of earlier studies by placing the American war within a European context. It takes a critical look at the command and operations of the first secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, and how under his direction the Navy proved itself ship for ship as--if not more--effective against French privateers than the Royal Navy. The book also examines how the Navy served the nation's commercial and diplomatic interests, a pattern of activity that would become known as gunboat diplomacy, and how the Navy's successes assured it a permanency that had eluded the Continental Navy. Awarded prizes from the American Revolution Round Table of New York and other organizations, the respected work answers penetrating questions about what happened and why, and the author's judicious evaluations of participants and their policies make an important contribution to the literature. This new Classics edition is introduced by the author, chair of the maritime history department at East Carolina University and author of three other books, including Origins of Maritime Strategy.