Why is it that despite the end of the Cold War and the almost constant controversies surrounding the alliance's role in the world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is still a prominent and vital player in international security? Joe Burton provides an in-depth analysis of NATO's changing role in the post–Cold War era and its ability to survive, adapt, and meet the needs of its members in an increasingly turbulent, globalized security environment. He offers a historically and theoretically informed account of NATO that isolates the core dynamics that have held the alliance together in troubled times. In particular, he examines a series of processes and events—from the 1990 Gulf War to the rise of the Islamic State—that help explain NATO's continuing relevance.

This book takes a new approach to answering the question of how NATO survived after the Cold War by examining its complex relationship with the United States. A closer look at major NATO engagements in the post-Cold War era, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, reveals how the US helped comprehensively reshape the alliance. In every conflict, there was tension between the United States and its allies over mission leadership, political support, legal precedents, military capabilities, and financial contributions. The author explores why allied actions resulted in both praise and criticism of NATO’s contributions from American policymakers, and why despite all of this and the growing concern over the alliance’s perceived shortcomings the United States continued to support the alliance. In addition to demonstrating the American influence on the alliance, this works demonstrates why NATO’s survival is beneficial to US interests.

A compelling, intimate account of how US foreign assistance in war zones and developing countries does not achieve its intended goals. From the hot savannah of Malawi to the cold, damp gray of Kosovo and into the volatile war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and other donors have invested enormous financial and human resources in major peacekeeping and development efforts. Why then is the world no closer to being a “better and safer” place? Both a salient critique of US foreign assistance and a thought-provoking memoir, Flash Points describes the issues with personnel, language, and gender dynamics, as well as the cross-cultural challenges that often undermine and betray the best intentions of policy makers comfortably situated in Washington. Revealed in illuminating flashbacks, Jade Wu recalls her experiences in each of these four countries highlighting how, all too often, Americans in the field and the US government were unable to learn the lessons that ought to have been learned when dealing with host countries and their people. The final results were efforts poorly conceived and executed and, ultimately, detrimental to American national interests. “Flash Points should be required reading for professionals in foreign assistance programs and could be used in formal training programs for aid workers before heading abroad. It will also interest the general reader. Many will find it a fascinating story of one woman’s experiences abroad. By leaving many pages with illuminating quoted dialogue, all readers will be lured on through Jade Wu’s adventures, right up to the final ‘flashback.’” — Robert W. Maule, Retired US Senior Foreign Service Officer “While there are a variety of books on the subject, few offer the unique perspective of the author who has been a Peace Corps volunteer in Africa and worked in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, countries where there have been major military, peacekeeping, and development efforts and investments. Wu’s perspective is that of an objective, critical observer who has worked in the trenches. Her observations are well-informed, astute, and compel the reader to think carefully about the ways in which this country often wastes enormous resources—including human lives—in efforts that are ill-conceived.” — Thomas R. Carter, Retired Senior Advisor, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

This book explores how and why the dangerous yet seemingly durable and stable world order forged during the Cold War collapsed in 1989, and how a new order was improvised out of its ruins. It is an unusual blend of memoir and scholarship that takes us back to the years when the East-West conflict came to a sudden end and a new world was born. In this book, senior officials and opinion leaders from the United States, Russia, Western and Eastern Europe who were directly involved in the decisions of that time describe their considerations, concerns, and pressures. They are joined by scholars who have been able to draw on newly declassified archival sources to revisit this challenging period.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.

Mission Failure argues that, in the past 25 years, the U.S. military has turned to missions that are largely humanitarian and socio-political - and that this ideologically-driven foreign policy generally leads to failure.

How do once bitter enemies move beyond entrenched rivalry at the diplomatic level? In one of the first attempts to apply practice theory to the study of International Relations, Vincent Pouliot builds on Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to devise a theory of practice of security communities and applies it to post-Cold War security relations between NATO and Russia. Based on dozens of interviews and a thorough analysis of recent history, Pouliot demonstrates that diplomacy has become a normal, though not a self-evident, practice between the two former enemies. He argues that this limited pacification is due to the intense symbolic power struggles that have plagued the relationship ever since NATO began its process of enlargement at the geographical and functional levels. So long as Russia and NATO do not cast each other in the roles that they actually play together, security community development is bound to remain limited.