RAND researchers facilitated three wargaming events to explore command and control of NATO's amphibious forces in major combat operations. The authors note results and implications for future force development.

The US armed forces were responsible for many tactical innovations during the years 1941–45, but in no field was US mastery more complete than amphibious warfare. In the vast, almost empty battlefield of the Pacific the US Navy and Marine Corps were obliged to develop every aspect of the amphibious assault landing in painstaking detail, from the design of many new types of vessel, down to the tactics of the rifle platoon hitting the beach, and the logistic system without which they could not have fought their way inland. This fascinating study offers a clear, succinct explanation of every phase of these operations as they evolved during the war years, illustrated with detailed color plates and photographs.

The Decline of European Naval Forces aims to provide insight into the evolution of Europe’s naval forces since the end of the Cold War. To illuminate the drastic changes many European navies have undergone over the last twenty-five years, Jeremy Stöhs analyzes the defense policies and naval strategies of eleven European states as well as the evolution, deployment, and capabilities of their respective naval forces. In these case studies, the development of Europe’s most important naval forces is assessed per the respective strategic framework in which they have operated over the past two decades. Stöhs describes not only the general composition of each force but also the range of their capabilities and their important technical features. His study shows that since the end of the Cold War, all but a few European navies have significantly decreased in size and, thus, have ceded important capabilities along the way. Based on the understanding of sea power as a prerequisite for political influence and economic health, the consequences of the geopolitical shift toward the Asian-Pacific region, and most importantly the general decline of Europe’s traditional naval capabilities, the author concludes that the ability of European states to influence events near and abroad by means of their naval forces has atrophied and will continue to be called into question in the future.

In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.