This is a critical analysis of the NATO crises of 1966-67 - a period when a number of issues which had been developing for some time within NATO came to a head. It sets out the diplomacy of the period in a broad historical context and provides detailed, related case studies.

Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so competitive? Indeed, why are today's major geopolitical rivalries intensifying? In The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press tackle the central puzzle of the nuclear age: the persistence of intense geopolitical competition in the shadow of nuclear weapons. They explain why the Cold War superpowers raced so feverishly against each other; why the creation of "mutual assured destruction" does not ensure peace; and why the rapid technological changes of the 21st century will weaken deterrence in critical hotspots around the world. By explaining how the nuclear revolution falls short, Lieber and Press discover answers to the most pressing questions about deterrence in the coming decades: how much capability is required for a reliable nuclear deterrent, how conventional conflicts may become nuclear wars, and how great care is required now to prevent new technology from ushering in an age of nuclear instability.

How have nuclear weapons affected the way countries deal with one another? The Nuclear Revolution answers this question by comparing the nuclear age with previous periods of international history, from the fifth century B.C. to the twentieth century. The Nuclear Revolution offers insightful and provocative perspectives on the Soviet-American nuclear arms race, comparing it with the Anglo-German naval rivalry before World War I and with modern tariff competitions. The work also compares the advent of nuclear weapons with the two other modern revolutions in warfare: Napoleon's military innovations and the industrial warfare of World War I. It assesses the impact of nuclear armaments on the balance of power, alliances, and the behaviour of national leaders. Also included is an analysis of the differences between nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. The concuding chapter, bringing together ideas from history, religion, and psychology, explores the effects that the threat of nuclear annihilation has on everyday life.

This is a critical analysis of the NATO crises of 1966-67 - a period when a number of issues which had been developing for some time within NATO came to a head. It sets out the diplomacy of the period in a broad historical context and provides detailed, related case studies.

For more than forty years NATO premised its defence on credible nuclear deterrence. Underwriting this deterrence was NATO's strategy and the nuclear weapons and command and control systems intended to make the strategy an operational reality. This book examines NATO's attempts between 1952 and 1990 to achieve the political and military control of nuclear weapons operations in a multinational organisation. By using case-studies of US, British, French and NATO nuclear weapons operations and empirical evidence from Cold War crises it provides an analysis of NATO's experience and offers insights for the present day.

Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so competitive? Indeed, why are today's major geopolitical rivalries intensifying? In The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press tackle the central puzzle of the nuclear age: the persistence of intense geopolitical competition in the shadow of nuclear weapons. They explain why the Cold War superpowers raced so feverishly against each other; why the creation of "mutual assured destruction" does not ensure peace; and why the rapid technological changes of the 21st century will weaken deterrence in critical hotspots around the world. By explaining how the nuclear revolution falls short, Lieber and Press discover answers to the most pressing questions about deterrence in the coming decades: how much capability is required for a reliable nuclear deterrent, how conventional conflicts may become nuclear wars, and how great care is required now to prevent new technology from ushering in an age of nuclear instability.

Robert Jervis argues here that the possibility of nuclear war has created a revolution in military strategy and international relations. He examines how the potential for nuclear Armageddon has changed the meaning of war, the psychology of statesmanship, and the formulation of military policy by the superpowers.