"This paper examines NATO's relations with the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe since the early 1990s, with due attention to problems as well as achievements. The paper also considers prospects for improved interorganizational coordination, bilateral and multilateral, with a view to more effective policy implementation."--P. 9.

In crisis management operations, strategic errors can cost lives. Some international organizations (IOs) learn from these failures whereas others tend to repeat them. Given that they have high rates of turnover, how is it possible that any IO retains knowledge about the past? This book introduces an argument for how and why IOs develop institutional memory from their efforts to manage crises. Findings indicate that the design of an IO's learning infrastructure (e.g. lessons learned offices and databases) can inadvertently disincentivize IO elites from using it to share knowledge about strategic errors. Elites - high-level officials in IOs - perceive reporting to be a risky endeavour. In response, they develop institutional memory by creating and using informal processes, including transnational interpersonal networks, private documentation and conversations during crisis management exercises. The result is an institutional memory that is highly dependent on only a handful of individuals. The book draws on the author's interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites across four countries. Cases of NATO crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine further illustrate the development of institutional memory. Findings challenge existing research on organizational learning by suggesting that formal learning processes alone are insufficient for ensuring that learning happens. The book also offers recommendations to policymakers for strengthening the learning capacity of IOs.

A comparative study of international organizations, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the interactions within and among the international system. The authors explore the political motivations of these organizations and assess their value and success. The book's comparative - rather than purely historical approach - will interest both students and scholars of political science.

In crisis management operations, strategic errors can cost lives. Some international organizations (IOs) learn from these failures whereas others tend to repeat them. Given that they have high rates of turnover, how is it possible that any IO retains knowledge about the past? This book introduces an argument for how and why IOs develop institutional memory from their efforts to manage crises. Findings indicate that the design of an IO's learning infrastructure (e.g. lessons learned offices and databases) can inadvertently disincentivize IO elites from using it to share knowledge about strategic errors. Elites - high-level officials in IOs - perceive reporting to be a risky endeavour. In response, they develop institutional memory by creating and using informal processes, including transnational interpersonal networks, private documentation and conversations during crisis management exercises. The result is an institutional memory that is highly dependent on only a handful of individuals. The book draws on the author's interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites across four countries. Cases of NATO crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine further illustrate the development of institutional memory. Findings challenge existing research on organizational learning by suggesting that formal learning processes alone are insufficient for ensuring that learning happens. The book also offers recommendations to policymakers for strengthening the learning capacity of IOs.

From the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the NATO International Staff and the European External Action Service, international bureaucrats make decisions that affect life and death. In carrying out their functions, these officials not only facilitate the work of the member states, but also pursue their own distinct agendas. This book analyzes how states seek to control secretariats when it comes to military operations by international organizations. It introduces an innovative theoretical framework that identifies different types of control mechanisms. The book presents six empirical chapters on the UN, NATO, and EU secretariats. It provides new data from a unique dataset and in-depth interviews. It shows that member states employ a wide range of control mechanisms to reduce the potential loss of influence. They frequently forfeit the gains of delegation to avoid becoming dependent on the work of secretariats. Yet while states invest heavily in control, this book also argues that they cannot benefit from the services of secretariats and keep full control over outcomes in international organizations. In their delegation and control decisions, states face trade-offs and have to weigh different cost categories: the costs of policy, administrative capacity, and agency loss. This book will be of interest to scholars, postgraduates, and officials in international organizations and national governments, dealing with questions of international political economy, security studies, and military affairs.