First published in 1990, National Security and International Relations provides a concise analysis of the problem of national security in the twentieth century. It examines the criteria by which states decide what level of security they want to seek in an uncertain and essentially Hobbesian world, and why some states tend to underinsure, while obsessively insecure states overinsure, frequently making others more insecure in the process. In the wake of two world wars and the threat of nuclear destruction, Peter Mangold argues that war was becoming as much a source of insecurity as the intentions of other states. It then explores the different approaches attempted during the twentieth century to ameliorate or ideally escape from the security dilemma. These range from international regimes, to the restructuring of the international politics of Western Europe so as to substitute cooperation for conflict, and U.S. and Soviet attempts to render nuclear competition safer through arms control and confidence building measures. Of special value to students of International Relations and Strategic Studies, this book will also interest those keen to understand the challenges embodied in Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy.

This book shows how dominant narratives have shaped the national security policies of the United States.

Examines the planning and budgeting processes of the United States. This title describes the planning and resource integration activities of the White House, reviews the adequacy of the structures and process and makes proposals for ways both might be reformed to fit the demands of the 21st century security environment.

Our ideas about national security have changed radically over the last five years. It has become a political tool, a "wedge issue," a symbol of pride and fear. It is also the one issue above all others that can make or break an election. And this is why the Democratic Party has been steadily losing power since 2001. In Hard Power, Michael O'Hanlon, an expert on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, and Kurt Campbell, an authority on international security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explain how the Democrats lost credibility on issues of security and foreign policy, how they can get it back -- and why they must. They recall the successful Democratic military legacy of past decades, as well as recent Democratic innovations -- like the Homeland Security Office and the idea of nation-building -- that have been successfully co-opted by the Republican administration. And, most importantly, they develop a broad national security vision for America, including specific defense policies and a strategy to win the war on terror.

While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country's military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful. Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.