Egyptian efforts to acquire long-range surface-to-surface missiles in the early 1960s carry important lessons for our time, when weapons of mass destruction and charges of politicizing intelligence are key issues. This new study traces the history of the early Egyptian ballistic missile program, which began with the successful recruitment of German scientists who had experience in Hitler’s V1 and V2 missile projects. Yet even as these Germans began their work on developing missiles for Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Israeli intelligence was busy collecting information on their activities, sparking a crisis in the Israeli leadership as top Israeli officials anxiously debated strategies to grapple with this new threat to their national security. Ultimately, they adopted a multifaceted approach that included intimidation of the scientists and their families, appeals to the West German government to order the scientists’ recall and an attempt to involve the US government in the intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Drawing extensively on material from recently declassified US government documents, this new major work demonstrates how Nasser’s missile program played an instrumental role in cementing the US-Israeli national security relationship. The book concludes with several key lessons that can help stem the global proliferation of advanced weapons. This book will be of great interest to scholars of proliferation, international relations, the Middle East, disarmament and security studies in general.

Egyptian efforts to acquire long-range surface-to-surface missiles in the early 1960s carry important lessons for our time, when weapons of mass destruction and charges of politicizing intelligence are key issues. This new study traces the history of the early Egyptian ballistic missile program, which began with the successful recruitment of German scientists who had experience in Hitler’s V1 and V2 missile projects. Yet even as these Germans began their work on developing missiles for Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Israeli intelligence was busy collecting information on their activities, sparking a crisis in the Israeli leadership as top Israeli officials anxiously debated strategies to grapple with this new threat to their national security. Ultimately, they adopted a multifaceted approach that included intimidation of the scientists and their families, appeals to the West German government to order the scientists’ recall and an attempt to involve the US government in the intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Drawing extensively on material from recently declassified US government documents, this new major work demonstrates how Nasser’s missile program played an instrumental role in cementing the US-Israeli national security relationship. The book concludes with several key lessons that can help stem the global proliferation of advanced weapons. This book will be of great interest to scholars of proliferation, international relations, the Middle East, disarmament and security studies in general.

The postwar period saw increased interest in the idea of relatively easy-to-manufacture but devastatingly lethal radiological munitions whose use would not discriminate between civilian and military targets. Death Dust explores the largely unknown history of the development of radiological weapons (RW)—weapons designed to disperse radioactive material without a nuclear detonation—through a series of comparative case studies across the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Iraq, and Egypt. The authors illuminate the historical drivers of and impediments to radiological weapons innovation. They also examine how new, dire geopolitical events—such as the war in Ukraine—could encourage other states to pursue RW and analyze the impact of the spread of such weapons on nuclear deterrence and the nonproliferation regime. Death Dust presents practical, necessary steps to reduce the likelihood of a resurgence of interest in and pursuit of radiological weapons by state actors.

This book offers an exploration of ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East and also delves into the geopolitical landscape to unveil a narrative of contemporary Middle Eastern history. The central focus of this book is to decipher the pivotal moments when three regional powers of the Middle East - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran - embraced ballistic capabilities as a strategic response to military vulnerabilities. The authors contend that the very essence of ballistic proliferation incorporates a tactical rationale provided by military needs that varies from one state to another, and it is upon the assessment of these military needs that the decision to procure ballistic missiles is made. Offering a blend of theoretical insights and primary sources-based case studies, this book dissects the decision-making processes that spurred these states to choose ballistic missiles, despite their inefficiencies in delivering conventional payloads. The absence of an effective air force emerges as a catalyst, triggering what the authors term a ‘moment of ballistic consciousness.' Spanning three diverse regimes, the work provides a rich historical tapestry and untangles the complexities of political decisions with military implications, providing a fresh perspective on global power dynamics. This narrative sheds light on the intersection of military strategy, geopolitical realities, and the pursuit of ballistic capabilities that shapes the world's security landscape. This book will be of much interest to students of arms control, nuclear proliferation, Middle Eastern politics, and International Relations.

The essential resource on military and political strategy and the making of the modern world The New Makers of Modern Strategy is the next generation of the definitive work on strategy and the key figures who have shaped the theory and practice of war and statecraft throughout the centuries. Featuring entirely new entries by a who’s who of world-class scholars, this new edition provides global, comparative perspectives on strategic thought from antiquity to today, surveying both classical and current themes of strategy while devoting greater attention to the Cold War and post-9/11 eras. The contributors evaluate the timeless requirements of effective strategy while tracing the revolutionary changes that challenge the makers of strategy in the contemporary world. Amid intensifying global disorder, the study of strategy and its history has never been more relevant. The New Makers of Modern Strategy draws vital lessons from history’s most influential strategists, from Thucydides and Sun Zi to Clausewitz, Napoleon, Churchill, Mao, Ben-Gurion, Andrew Marshall, Xi Jinping, and Qassem Soleimani. With contributions by Dmitry Adamsky, John Bew, Tami Davis Biddle, Hal Brands, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Elizabeth Economy, Charles Edel, Eric S. Edelman, Andrew Ehrhardt, Lawrence Freedman, John Lewis Gaddis, Francis J. Gavin, Christopher J. Griffin, Ahmed S. Hashim, Eric Helleiner, Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, Seth G. Jones, Robert Kagan, Jonathan Kirshner, Matthew Kroenig, James Lacey, Guy Laron, Michael V. Leggiere, Margaret MacMillan, Tanvi Madan, Thomas G. Mahnken, Carter Malkasian, Daniel Marston, John H. Maurer, Walter Russell Mead, Michael Cotey Morgan, Mark Moyar, Williamson Murray, S.C.M. Paine, Sergey Radchenko, Iskander Rehman, Thomas Rid, Joshua Rovner, Priya Satia, Kori Schake, Matt J. Schumann, Brendan Simms, Jason K. Stearns, Hew Strachan, Sue Mi Terry, and Toshi Yoshihara.

Central to CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein's career has been the mission to introduce America's military leaders to Arabic works of military significance. Just like American military leaders who had an obsession for all things Russian during the Cold War in order to understand the Soviets, the war on al-Qaida and the complex nuances of the Arab Spring demand a deeper comprehension of the Middle East from direct sources. The memoirs of General Mohamed Fawzi, Egyptian War Minister from 1967 to 1971, were first published in 1984, but his work has not ben translated and remains undiscovered by English speaking readers. Many in the United States Armed Services have yet to be introduced to his ideas, perspectives, and the seeds by which the 1973 Yom-Kippur War were laid. In this new contribution to his series of essays written for Infantry Journal, Aboul-Enein has determined to bring to life the military thoughts of this Arab War Minister. This book is a joint Infantry-Naval Institute Press project that has condensed the entire collection of essays on Fawzi to a single volume, to provide future generations of America’s military leaders with access his ideas. Fawzi is unique among Arab generals for his scathing critique of his own armed forces, and from his critical examination of what went wrong in 1967, he was able to slowly resurrect the Egyptian Armed Forces to a level that enabled Sadat to consider an offensive in 1973. This Egyptian general will provide insights into the level of Soviet cooperation and military aid provided Egypt after the 1967 Six-Day War, known simply in Arabic by one word, al-Naksah (the setback), not to be confused with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War known by one word, al-Nakbah (the catastrophe). While Fawzi lapses into conspiracy, indulges in wishful thinking, and employs the language of pan-Arabism on occasion, much like Soviet military theorists couched their ideas in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, this will not stop serious American students of war from recognizing his brilliance about the lessons learned from the crushing defeat of Egyptian arms in the 1967 Six-Day War.

Historical Dictionary of Egypt, Fifth Edition contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has more than 600 cross-referenced entries on important personalities as well as aspects of the country’s politics, economy, foreign relations, religion, and culture.