In the last two decades, interest in narrative conceptions of identity has grown exponentially, though there is little agreement about what a "life-narrative" might be. In connecting Kierkegaard with virtue ethics, several scholars have recently argued that narrative models of selves and MacIntyre's concept of the unity of a life help make sense of Kierkegaard's existential stages and, in particular, explain the transition from "aesthetic" to "ethical" modes of life. But others have recently raised difficult questions both for these readings of Kierkegaard and for narrative accounts of identity that draw on the work of MacIntyre in general. While some of these objections concern a strong kind of unity or "wholeheartedness" among an agent's long-term goals or cares, the fundamental objection raised by critics is that personal identity cannot be a narrative, since stories are artifacts made by persons. In this book, Davenport defends the narrative approach to practical identity and autonomy in general, and to Kierkegaard's stages in particular.

For the first time, this collection brings together figures in both contemporary philosophy and Kierkegaard studies to explore pressing issues in the philosophy of personal identity and moral psychology.

On Art and Selfhood lies at the intersection of existentialism and the philosophy of art. On the philosophy of art side, it addresses questions about why art matters and how we ought to appreciate it. On the existentialism side, it attends to questions pertaining to authenticity or authentic selfhood. That is to say, it focuses on issues and problems having to do with our personal identity or our sense of who we are. The goal of the book is to bring together these two topics in a productive manner by showing that works of art matter partly because they can help us with the project of selfhood. In other words, works of art are important in part because they can offer us much needed guidance and support as we try to figure out who we really are. To make the case for this thesis, On Art and Selfhood draws on the works of the Danish thinker, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55). It mines his writings for insights regarding aesthetics and personal identity, and then uses these insights to contribute to current discussions of these topics. Thus, the book speaks not only to those with interests in contemporary analytic philosophy but also to those with interests in historical scholarship on Kierkegaard.

One of the most basic and important distinctions we draw is between those entities with the capacity of agency and those without. As humans we enjoy agency in its full-blooded form and therefore a proper understanding of the nature of agency is of great importance to appreciate who we are and what we should expect and demand of our existence. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency is an outstanding reference source to the key issues, problems, and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising 42 chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into eight clear parts: The Metaphysics of Agency Kinds of Agency Agency and Ability Agency: Mind, Body, and World Agency and Knowledge Agency and Moral Psychology Agency and Time Agency, Reasoning, and Normativity. A broad range of topics are covered, including the relation of agency to causation, teleology, animal agency, intentionality, planning, skills, disability, practical knowledge, self-knowledge, the will, responsibility, autonomy, identification, emotions, personal identity, reasons, morality, the law, aesthetics, and games. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency is essential reading for students and researchers within philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of psychology, and ethics.

Presents new approaches to one of Kierkegaard's most important texts, shedding light on themes such as selfhood, despair, and sin.

Death comes for us all – eventually. Philosophers have long been perplexed by how we ought to feel about death. Many people fear death and believe that death is bad for the person who dies. But is death bad for us, and if so, how is its badness best explained? If we do not survive death –if death is simply a state of nothingness – how can death be bad for us? If death is bad for us, do we have good reason to live as long as possible? Would an immortal life really be a good human life – or would even an immortal life eventually become tedious and make us long for mortality? This volume presents fourteen philosophical essays that examine our attitudes toward mortality and immortality. The topics addressed have become more urgent as scientists attempt to extend the human lifespan, perhaps even indefinitely. This book invites the reader to critically appraise his or her own attitudes toward death and immortality by exploring the ethical, metaphysical, and psychological complexities associated with these issues.

Anthony Rudd presents a striking new account of the self as an ethical, evaluative being. He draws on Kierkegaard's thought to present a case for an ancient and currently neglected view: that the tensions which are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through the understanding of the self as guided by an objective Good.