Would you like to start earning CASH with no out of pocket expense starting TODAY? Then this book is for you. My system can work for part time employees, college students, home makers that have little time available, and seasoned investors as well. By helping homeowners stay in there homes you can charge from $300.00 to $2500.00 for as little as one hour of your time. By putting contracts together from defaulting homeowners and then offering them to other investors you can earn $5000.00 to $10.000. per contract. I wrote this book as a guide of what not to do when you first start your investing career...based on the hype of the infomercials we all see and here and what I personally experienced when first entering the real estate investing market. I wanted to give to the new investor a chance to really inter the investing arena loaded with information and a guide to create cash to support there investment career and with a fresh new approach... Do Not take advantage of the defaulting homeowner! Try to approach every deal with a win/win attitude. It will give you a new wealth financially and a great feeling of really being able to help someone in need of your experience and expertise. The public will be calling and recommending your services because of your fair treatment of them instead of the cut them off at the knees approach that everyone else is teaching. This book will teach you the real estate terms that you need to know to be effective when talking to bankers, other investors, real estate agents and title companies. It will teach you how to start earning cash TODAY, with no out of pocket expense just your time. Enjoy this very candid journey and as always; Happy Investing....Tom Duncan

This paper incorporates house price risk and mortgages into a standard incomplete market (SIM) model. The model is calibrated to match U.S. data and accounts for non-targeted features of the data such as the distribution of down payments, the life-cycle profile of home ownership, and the mortgage default rate. The average coefficients that measure the agents' ability to self-insure against income shocks are similar to those of a SIM model without housing but housing increases the values of these coefficients for younger agents. The response of consumption to house price shocks is minimal. The introduction of minimum down payments or income garnishment benefits a majority of the population.

This paper incorporates house price risk and mortgages into a standard incomplete market (SIM) model. The model is calibrated to match U.S. data and accounts for non-targeted features of the data such as the distribution of down payments, the life-cycle profile of home ownership, and the mortgage default rate. The average coefficients that measure the agents' ability to self-insure against income shocks are similar to those of a SIM model without housing but housing increases the values of these coefficients for younger agents. The response of consumption to house price shocks is minimal. The introduction of minimum down payments or income garnishment benefits a majority of the population.

The authors develop an equilibrium valuation model that incorporates optimal default to show how mortgage yields and lender recovery rates on defaulted mortgages depend on initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The analysis treats both the frictionless case and the case in which borrowers and lenders incur deadweight costs upon default. The model is calibrated using data on California mortgages. Given reasonable parameter values, the model does a surprisingly good job fitting the risk premium in the data for high LTV mortgages. Thus, from an ex ante perspective, the authors do not find strong evidence of systematic underpricing of default risk in the run-up to the housing market crisis. Charts and tables.

This article compares default patterns among prime and subprime mortgages, analyzes the factors correlated with default, and examines how forecasts of defaults are affected by alternative assumptions about trends in home prices. The authors find that extremely pessimistic forecasts of home price appreciation could have generated predictions of subprime defaults that were closer to the actual default experience for loans originated in 2006 and 2007. However, for prime loans one would have also had to anticipate that defaults would become much more sensitive to home prices. Tables and graphs.