This book offers an analysis of shame (as a state, disposition, activity, and social relation) and develops an interdisciplinary and comparative interpretation of Confucian shame as a moral disposition, the ability of critical moral-development and self-cultivation.

Early Confucian philosophers (notably Confucius and Mencius) emphasized moral significance of shame in self-cultivation and learning. In their discussion, shame is not just a painful sense of moral failure or transgression but also a moral disposition and a form of moral excellence (i.e., virtue) that is essential to Confucian self-cultivation. In Moral Psychology of Confucian Shame, Bongrae Seok argues that shame is a genuine moral emotion and moral disposition. Engaging with recent studies of social psychology, cultural psychology, biology, and anthropology, Seok explains that shame is a uniquely evolved form of moral emotion that is comparable to, but not identical with, guilt. The author goes on to develop an interpretation of Confucian shame that reveals the embodied, interactive, and transformative nature of the Confucian moral self.

This is a book about the body and its amazing contribution to the moral mind. The author focuses on the important roles the body plays in moral cognition. What happens to us when we observe moral violations, make moral judgments and engage in moral actions? How does the body affect our moral decisions and shape our moral dispositions? Can embodied moral psychology be consistently pursued as a viable alternative to disembodied traditions of moral philosophy? Is there any school of philosophy where the body is discussed as the underlying foundation of moral judgment and action? To answer these questions, the author analyzes Confucian philosophy as an intriguing and insightful example of embodied moral psychology.

In most Western societies, guilt is widely regarded as a vital moral emotion. In addition to playing a central role in moral development and progress, many take the capacity to feel guilt as a defining feature of morality itself: no truly moral person escapes the pang of guilt when she has done something wrong. But proponents of guilt's importance face important challenges, such as distinguishing healthy from pathological forms of guilt, and accounting for the fact that not all cultures value guilt in the same way, if at all. In this volume, philosophers and psychologists come together to think more systematically about the nature and value of guilt. The book begins with chapters on the biological origins and psychological nature of guilt and moves on to discuss the culturally enriched conceptions of guilt and its value that we find in various eastern and western philosophic traditions. In addition, numerous chapters discuss healthy or morally valuable forms guilt and their pathological or irrational shadows.

Few emotions have divided opinion as deeply as shame. Some scholars have argued that shame is essentially a maladaptive emotion used to oppress minorities and reinforce stigmas and traumas, an emotion that leaves the self at the mercy of powerful others. Other scholars, however, have argued that the absence of a sense of shame in a subject—their shamelessness—is tantamount to a vicious moral insensitivity. As the eleven original chapters in this collection attest, however, shame scholars are entering a new phase, one in which scholarship no longer attempts to defend one side of shame against the other, but rather accepts both faces as faithful to the phenomenon to be explained. At the core of our understanding of shame there are profound disagreements about the importance of the Other in shaping our moral identity. As this collection shows by its study of shame, the difficulty of the connection between Self, Other, and morality spans over millennia and cultures and currently animates important debates at the core of feminism and disability studies. Contributors: Mark Alfano, Alessandra Fussi, Lorenzo Greco, JeeLoo Liu, Katrine Krause-Jensen, Heidi L. Maibom, Tjeert Olthof, Imke von Maur, Alba Montes Sánchez, Raffaele Rodogno, Alessandro Salice, Krista K. Thomason, Íngrid Vendrell Ferran

"Critically developing the Contemporary New Confucianism, this book opens a new horizon for the study of emotions and philosophy of heart-mind and [human] nature by focusing on the communication between phenomenology, particularly Schelerian phenomenology, and Chinese philosophy, especially Mencius and Wang Yangming. Such communication demonstrates how ethics based on factual experience is possible, revealing the original spirit and fresh meaning of Confucian learning of the heart-mind. In clarifying crucial feelings and values, this work undertakes a detailed description of the heart's concrete activities for the idea that "the heart has its own order," allowing us to see the order of the heart and its deviated form clearly and comprehensively"--

This book comprises 30 chapters representing certain new trends in reconcenptualizing Confucian ideas, ideals, values and ways of thinking by scholars from China and abroad. While divergent in approaches, these chapters are converged on conceptualizing and reconceptualizing Confucianism into something philosophically meaningful and valuable to the people of the 21st century. They are grouped into three parts, and each is dedicated to one of the three major themes this book attempts to address. Part one is mainly on scholarly reviews of Confucian doctrines by which new interpretations will be drawn out. Part two is an assembled attempt to reexamine Confucian concepts, in which critiques of traditional views lead to new perspectives for perennial questions. Part three is focused on reinterpreting Confucian virtues and values, in the hope that a new sense of being moral can be gained through old normative forms.