General Bernard Law Montgomery, affectionately known as "Monty," exerted an influence on the Canadian Army more lasting than that of any other Second World War commander. In 1942 he assumed responsibility for the exercise and training of Canadian formations in England, and by the end of the war Canada’s field army was second to none in the practical exercise of combined arms. In Monty and the Canadian Army, John A. English analyses the way Montgomery’s operational influence continued to permeate the Canadian Army. For years, the Canadian Army remained a highly professional force largely because it was commanded at almost every lower level by "Monty men" steeped in the Montgomery method. The era of the Canadian Army headed by such men ceased with the integration and unification of Canada’s armed forces in 1964. The embrace of Montgomery by Canadian soldiers stands in marked contrast to largely negative perceptions held by Americans. Monty and the Canadian Army aims to correct such perceptions, which are mostly superficial and more often than not wrong, and addresses the anomaly of how this gifted general, one of the greatest field commanders of the Second World War, managed to win over other North American troops.

Honest reappraisal of the Canadian experience in Normandy Special focus on the struggle to close the Falaise Gap Relies on archival records, including Bernard Montgomery's personal correspondence John A. English presents a detailed examination of the role of the Canadian Army in Normandy from the D-Day landings in June 1944 through the closing of the Falaise Gap in August.

Historian John Buckley offers a radical reappraisal of Great Britain’s fighting forces during World War Two, challenging the common belief that the British Army was no match for the forces of Hitler’s Germany. Following Britain’s military commanders and troops across the battlefields of Europe, from D-Day to VE-Day, from the Normandy beaches to Arnhem and the Rhine, and, ultimately, to the Baltic, Buckley’s provocative history demonstrates that the British Army was more than a match for the vaunted Nazi war machine.div /DIVdivThis fascinating revisionist study of the campaign to liberate Northern Europe in the war’s final years features a large cast of colorful unknowns and grand historical personages alike, including Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and the prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill. By integrating detailed military history with personal accounts, it evokes the vivid reality of men at war while putting long-held misconceptions finally to rest./DIV

In December 1943, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton resigned from command of the 1st Canadian Army amidst criticism of his poor generalship and of his abrasive personality. Despite McNaughton's importance to the Canadian Army during the first four years of the Second World War, little has been written about the man himself or the circumstances of his resignation. In The Politics of Command, the first full-length study of the subject since 1969, John Nelson Rickard analyzes McNaughton's performance during exercise SPARTAN in March 1943 and assesses his relationships with key figures such as Sir Alan F. Brooke, Bernard Paget, and Harry Crerar. This detailed re-examination of McNaughton's command argues that the long-accepted reasons for his relief of duty require extensive modification. Based on a wide range of sources, The Politics of Command will redefine how military historians and all Canadians look not only at "Andy" McNaughton, but the Canadian Army as well.

The Allied campaign for Northwest Europe as seen from a British and Canadian perspective A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines the "Colossal Cracks" operational technique employed by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group. Rooted in concerns about morale and casualties, "Colossal Cracks" was a cautious, firepower-laden approach that involved the concentration of massive force at points of German weakness. Hart argues that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested and that "Colossal Cracks" represented the most appropriate weapon the British Army could develop under the circumstances.

They thought of themselves as the "Cinderella Army," and international correspondents agreed. This was because First Canadian Army had been relegated to the left flank of the Allied advance toward Germany from the Normandy beaches and given the tough, thankless task of opening the Channel ports from Le Havre to Ostend in Belgium. Then suddenly in early September 1944, securing these ports became an Allied priority, as this would allow Field Marshal Montgomery to drive to the Rhine with Operation Market Garden and win the war before Christmas. Given only scant access to the Allied supply chain, the Canadians and their British partners in I Corps tackled the task assigned. Just getting to the ports proved a terrific undertaking fought against brutal German resistance. And once there, they faced fortresses that had been prepared for years to defeat an attack. "Lost outposts," the Allies called them, but the Germans within were not going to give up easily. And so over the month of September, the Canadians set about fighting for control of each port, scrambling for supplies while under constant military pressure to get those ports open now. For Canada this was the Cinderella Campaign, the battle for the Channel ports. For those who fought it, the sacrifice of comrades dead and wounded would never be forgotten.

Using a combination of new perspectives and new evidence, this book presents a reinterpretation of how 21st Army Group produced a successful combined arms doctrine by late 1944 and implemented this in early 1945. Historians, professional military personnel and those interested in military history should read this book, which contributes to the radical reappraisal of Great Britain’s fighting forces in the last years of the Second World War, with an exploration of the reasons why 21st Army Group was able in 1944–45 to integrate the operations of its armor and infantry. The key to understanding how the outcome developed lies in understanding the ways in which the two processes of fighting and the creation of doctrine interrelated. This requires both a conventional focus on command and a cross-level study of Montgomery and a significant group of commanders. The issue of whether or not this integration of combat arms (a guide to operational fighting capability) had any basis in a common doctrine is an important one. Alongside this stands the new light this work throws on how such doctrine was created. A third interrelated contribution is in answering how Montgomery commanded, and whether and to what extent, doctrine was imposed or generated. Further it investigates how a group of ‘effervescent’ commanders interrelated, and what the impact of those interrelationships was in the formulation of a workable doctrine. The book makes an original contribution to the debate on Montgomery’s command style in Northwest Europe and its consequences, and integrates this with tracking down and disentangling the roots of his ideas, and his role in the creation of doctrine for the British Army’s final push against the Germans. In particular the author is able to do something that has defeated previous authors: to explain how doctrine was evolved and, especially who was responsible for providing the crucial first drafts, and the role Montgomery played in revising, codifying and disseminating it.