The U.S. Navy is currently designing the next generation aircraft carrier, the CVN 21. This class of carriers will use the same basic hull form as the current Nimitz class but will include a substantial redesign of the interior of the ship for improved weapons handling and stores management functions. It will also incorporate several new technologies including a new propulsion system and new aircraft launch and recovery systems. These improvements not only will increase the operational capability of the ship but also are anticipated to lower the ship's manpower requirements and maintenance costs. Under current force modernization plans, new ships of the CVN 21 class will be introduced every four or five years as the ships of the Nimitz class reach the end of their planned 50-year operational life. Under this strategy, Nimitz class carriers will be operating for over 50 more years and it will take decades to transform the aircraft carrier fleet to ships of the new class.On the basis of some preliminary calculations that appeared promising, RAND proposed to the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Aircraft Carriers an examination of a way to accelerate the transformation of the carrier force: replacing Nimitz-class carriers as they reach mid-life instead of refueling them. In this report we identify specific fleet management options for building new instead of refueling, and we evaluate their advantages and disadvantages. This report should be of interest to Navy and Office of Secretary of Defense planners examining fleet modernization options, especially those organizations addressing the costs of alternative force structure options.

Updated 12/10/2020: In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that callsfor achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-shipgoal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense AuthorizationAct (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense(DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal.The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring asmaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier oflarge unmanned vehicles (UVs). On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a document that can beviewed as its vision for future Navy force structure and/or a draft version of the FY202230-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The document presents a Navy force-level goal that callsfor achieving by 2045 a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, 382 to 446 mannedships, and 143 to 242 large UVs. The Administration that takes office on January 20, 2021,is required by law to release the FY2022 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan in connection withDOD's proposed FY2022 budget, which will be submitted to Congress in 2021. In preparingthe FY2022 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Administration that takes office on January 20,2021, may choose to adopt, revise, or set aside the document that was released on December9, 2020. The Navy states that its original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurement ofeight new ships, but this figure includes LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship thatCongress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated procurement funding for) in FY2020.Excluding this ship, the Navy's original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurementof seven new ships rather than eight. In late November 2020, the Trump Administrationreportedly decided to request the procurement of a second Virginia-class attack submarinein FY2021. CRS as of December 10, 2020, had not received any documentation from theAdministration detailing the exact changes to the Virginia-class program funding linesthat would result from this reported change. Pending the delivery of that information fromthe administration, this CRS report continues to use the Navy's original FY2021 budgetsubmission in its tables and narrative discussions.

Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.

Contents: (1) Scope, Sources, and Terminology; (2) Overview of China¿s Naval Modern.; Inception; Elements of Modern. Effort; Limitations and Weaknesses; Reasons for Modern. Effort; Elements of China¿s Naval Modern.; Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles; Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles; Subs.; Aircraft Carriers; Surface Combatants; Amphibious Ships; Maritime Surveill. and Targeting Systems; Operations Away From Home Waters; Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities; Potential Oversight Issues for Congress; China as a Defense-Planning Priority; (3) Potential Navy-Related Program Implications; Highly Capable Ships and Aircraft; Pacific Fleet¿s Share of the Navy; Homeporting Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations; Larger vs. Smaller Ships.

"RAND therefore investigated cost-effective workforce-management strategies, alternative workload allocations, and the relevant best practices of comparable organizations. The authors concluded that the Navy uses practices common in other organizations to manage workload variability and uncertainty. However, the Navy's workload forecasts have consistently underestimated the eventual demand on the shipyards. To accomplish the additional, unplanned work, the Navy has used overtime levels that significantly exceed cost-effective levels."-- P. [4] of cover.

This illustrated history covers the history of the U.S. Navy in the Middle East. America's interests in the Middle East, southwest Asia, and eastern Africa date almost to the founding of the nation. Since World War II, the Navy has been the first line of defense for these interests. From the establishment of the Middle East Force (MEF) in 1949 through the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. Navy served as a force for stability and peace in the region.

The U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are in the process of replacing the bulk of today¿s fighter aircraft ¿ most of which were purchased in the 1980s ¿ with new F/A-18E/F, F-22, and F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) aircraft. Although current procurement plans call for the purchase of about 2,500 aircraft over the next 25 years, the services are projecting that those purchases will not keep pace with the need to retire today¿s aircraft as they reach the limit of their service life. This study examines the capabilities and costs of the fighter force under DoD plans and the potential implications for DoD¿s long-term budget and inventory levels if planned purchases of new aircraft are insufficient to maintain fighter inventories called for by current service requirements.