A survey of Chinese warfare, both internal and international, from the opium wars of the 1840s through to the end of Vietnam.

The first book in English to study this period of Chinese history, this comprehensive survey sets out the major military events in chapters and argues that war was the most important tool used by the Chinese in building and maintaining their empire.

Shortly after 300 AD, barbarian invaders from Inner Asia toppled China's Western Jin dynasty, leaving the country divided and at war for several centuries. Despite this, the empire gradually formed a unified imperial order. Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900 explores the military strategies, institutions and wars that reconstructed the Chinese empire that has survived into modern times. Drawing on classical Chinese sources and the best modern scholarship from China and Japan, David A. Graff connects military affairs with political and social developments to show how China's history was shaped by war.

Wong argues that the opium trade played a large causative role in the Anglo-Chinese Arrow War.

Now in a fully updated edition, this accessible text provides a balanced history of modern China in a global context. Through years of living and research in China, Taiwan, Japan, and Russia, the authors are deeply qualified to understand China’s internal dynamics as well as its foreign relations over centuries. Arguing that modern Chinese history cannot be understood without a deep appreciation of the outside factors that have influenced the country, the authors focus on China’s near neighbors, especially Japan and Russia. They also emphasize the tragic role of almost endless warfare throughout Chinese history. Providing a unique comparative approach, the authors bridge the cultural divide separating Chinese history from Western readers trying to understand it. Specifically geared to the teaching requirements of the semester system, the book is divided into four parts and a total of twenty-eight chapters, corresponding either to two chapters per week in a fourteen-week semester or one chapter per week in a two-semester course.

The Lin Biao affair, which saw the Minister of Defence dramatically rise to become Mao Zedong's designated successor at the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and, even more dramatically, die in a plane crash while fleeing his country in September 1971, remains the least understood of all Chinese Communist Party elite conflicts of the Maoist era. Despite the pivotal importance of Lin's rise and fall in the history of contemporary China, his career has received little scholarly attention. In this pathbreaking study Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun offer an interpretation which radically undermines the standard view of Lin Biao as an ambitious politician who manoeuvred his way to the top, adopted a radical position during the Cultural Revolution to promote his own interests, and eventually came undone by seeking to consolidate his own power and military dominance over the polity, thus leading to a vicious power struggle with Mao. They reveal Lin as someone basically uninterested in power or even politics, who was thrust into leading positions and the successor role by Mao against his wishes; who never opposed Mao politically but instead attempted to follow his wishes in every way to the extent that they could be determined; who had no policy programme, whose rare initiatives were on the side of moderation; and whose political decline was due to Mao's reaction to complex factors unconnected with either a bid by Lin for personal aggrandizement or an effort to entrench army power. In this Teiwes and Sun refute both the official Chinese verdict on Lin Biao and the prevailing Western interpretation.

The print edition is available as a set of two volumes (9789004091733).