In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings.

After 2 decades, policymakers and regulators agree that electricity market reform, liberalization and privatization remains partly art. Moreover, the international experience suggests that in nearly all cases, initial market reform leads to unintended consequences or introduces new risks, which must be addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms. Competitive Electricity Markets describes the evolution of the market reform process including a number of challenging issues such as infrastructure investment, resource adequacy, capacity and demand participation, market power, distributed generation, renewable energy and global climate change. Sequel to Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective in the same series published in 2006 Contributions from renowned scholars and practitioners on significant electricity market design and implementation issues Covers timely topics on the evolution of electricity market liberalization worldwide

Due to the characteristics of electricity, power markets rank among the most complex markets operated at present. The requirements of an environmentally sustainable, economically efficient, and secure energy supply have resulted in the emergence of several interrelated markets that have to be carefully engineered in order to ensure efficient market outcomes. This book presents an agent-based simulation model that facilitates electricity market research. Simulation outcomes from this model are validated against price data from German power markets. The results significantly contribute to existing research in agent-based simulation and electricity market modeling, and provide insights into the impact of the market structure and market design on electricity prices. The book addresses researchers, lecturers and students who are interested in applying agent-based simulation to power markets. It provides a thorough discussion of the methodology and helpful details for model implementation.

Get up-to-speed with the fundamentals of how electricity markets are structured and operated with this comprehensive textbook, presenting coverage of key topics in electricity market design, including power system and power market operations, transmission, unit commitment, demand response, and risk management. It includes over 140 practical examples, inspired by real-industry applications, connecting key theoretical concepts to practical scenarios in electricity market design, and features over 100 coding-based examples and exercises, with selected solutions for readers. It further demonstrates how mathematical programming models are implemented in an industry setting. Requiring no experience in power systems or energy economics, this is the ideal introduction to electricity markets for senior undergraduate and graduate students in electrical engineering, economics, and operations research, and a robust introduction to the field for professionals in utilities, energy policy, and energy regulation. Accompanied online by datasets, AMPL code, supporting videos, and full solutions and lecture slides for instructors.

This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles. On the one hand, long-term contracts may contribute to lasting generation capability by allowing for a more efficient allocation of risk. On the other hand, they can create conditions for imperfect competition and thus impair short-term efficiency. The contributors – prominent academics and policy experts with inter-disciplinary perspectives – develop fresh theoretical and practical insights on this important concern for current electricity markets. This highly accessible book will strongly appeal to both academic and professional audiences including scholars of industrial, organizational and public sector economics, and competition and antitrust law. It will also be of value to regulatory and antitrust authorities, governmental policymakers, and consultants in electricity law and economics.

This dissertation focuses on selected issues in regard to the mathematical modeling of electricity markets. In a first step the interrelations of electric power market modeling are highlighted a crossroad between operations research, applied economics, and engineering. In a second step the development of a large-scale continental European economic engineering model named ELMOD is described and the model is applied to the issue of wind integration. It is concluded that enabling the integration of low-carbon technologies appears feasible for wind energy. In a third step algorithmic work is carried out regarding a game theoretic model. Two approaches in order to solve a discretely-constrained mathematical program with equilibrium constraints using disjunctive constraints are presented. The first one reformulates the problem as a mixed-integer linear program and the second one applies the Benders decomposition technique. Selected numerical results are reported.