Since the ground-breaking work of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others in the 1960s and 70s, one dominant interest of analytic philosophers has been in modal truths, which concerns the questions of what is possible and what is necessary. However, there is considerable controversy over the source and nature of necessity. In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment takes a novel approach to the study of modality that places special emphasis on understanding the origin of modal notions in everyday thought. Kment argues that the concepts of necessity and possibility originate in a common type of thought experiment—counterfactual reasoning—that allows us to investigate explanatory connections. This procedure is closely related to the controlled experiments of empirical science. Necessity is defined in terms of causation and other forms of explanation such as grounding, the relation that connects metaphysically fundamental facts to non-fundamental ones. Therefore, contrary to a widespread view, explanation is more fundamental than modality. The study of modal facts is important for philosophy, not because these facts are of much metaphysical interest in their own right, but because they provide evidence about explanatory relationships. In the course of developing this position, the book offers new accounts of possible worlds, counterfactual conditionals, essential truths and their role in grounding, and a novel theory of how counterfactuals relate to causation and explanation.

Boris Kment takes a new approach to the study of modality that emphasises the origin of modal notions in everyday thought. He argues that the concepts of necessity and possibility originate in counterfactual reasoning, which allows us to investigate explanatory connections. Contrary to accepted views, explanation is more fundamental than modality.

An expansive, yet succinct, analysis of the Philosophy of Religion – from metaphysics through theology. Organized into two sections, the text first examines truths concerning what is possible and what is necessary. These chapters lay the foundation for the book’s second part – the search for a metaphysical framework that permits the possibility of an ultimate explanation that is correct and complete. A cutting-edge scholarly work which engages with the traditional metaphysician’s quest for a true ultimate explanation of the most general features of the world we inhabit Develops an original view concerning the epistemology and metaphysics of modality, or truths concerning what is possible or necessary Applies this framework to a re-examination of the cosmological argument for theism Defends a novel version of the Leibnizian cosmological argument

This book defends a radical new theory of contingency as a physical phenomenon. Drawing on the many-worlds approach, it argues that quantum theories are best understood as telling us about the space of genuine possibilities, rather than as telling us solely about actuality.

This book is a monograph on the topic of Proof-Theoretic Semantics, a theory of meaning constituting an alternative to the more traditional Model-Theoretic Semantics. The latter regards meaning as truth-conditions (in arbitrary models), the former regards meaning as canonical derivability conditions in a meaning-conferring natural-deduction proof-system. In the first part of the book, the Proof-Theoretic Semantics for logic is presented. It surveys the way a natural-deduction system can serve as meaning-conferring, and in particular analyses various criteria such a system has to meet in order to qualify as meaning-conferring. A central criterion is harmony, a balance between introduction-rules and elimination-rules. The theory is applied to various logics, e.g., relevance logic, and various proof systems such as multi-conclusion natural-deduction and bilateralism. The presentation is inspired by recent work by the author, and also surveys recent developments. In part two, the theory is applied to fragments of natural language, both extensional and intensional, a development based on the author's recent work. For example, conservativity of determiners, once set up in a proof-theoretic framework, becomes a provable property of all (regular) determiners. It is shown that meaning need not carry the heavy ontological load characteristic of Model-Theoretic Semantics of complex natural language constructs. Nissim Francez is an emeritus professor of computer science at the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology. At a certain point in his career he moved from research related to concurrent and distributed programming and program verification to research in computational linguistics, mainly formal semantics of natural language. In recent years, he has worked on Proof-Theoretic Semantics, in particular for natural language.

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This groundbreaking volume investigates the most fundamental question of all: Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is explored from diverse and radical perspectives: religious, naturalistic, platonistic and skeptical. Does science answer the question? Or does theology? Does everything need an explanation? Or can there be brute, inexplicable facts? Could there have been nothing whatsoever? Or is there any being that could not have failed to exist? Is the question meaningful after all? The volume advances cutting-edge debates in metaphysics, philosophy of cosmology and philosophy of religion, and will intrigue and challenge readers interested in any of these subjects.