A close examination of the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes.

Canada's machinery of government is out of joint. In Breaking the Bargain, Donald J. Savoie reveals how the traditional deal struck between politicians and career officials that underpins the workings of our national political and administrative process is today being challenged. He argues that the role of bureaucracy within the Canadian political machine has never been properly defined, that the relationship between elected and permanent government officials is increasingly problematic, and that the public service cannot function if it is expected to be both independent of, and subordinate to, elected officials. While the public service attempts to define its own political sphere, the House of Commons is also in flux: the prime minister and his close advisors wield ever more power, and cabinet no longer occupies the policy ground to which it is entitled. Ministers, who have traditionally been able to develop their own roles, have increasingly lost their autonomy. Federal departmental structures are crumbling, giving way to a new model that eschews boundaries in favour of sharing policy and program space with outsiders. The implications of this functional shift are profound, having a deep impact on how public policies are struck, how government operates, and, ultimately, the capacity for accountability.

Despite the apparent political similarities in Western Europe, the models of cabinet government employed by different nations vary. In exploring the ministerial profession, this text reveals the political traditions and the different needs and expectations of citizen and politician alike.

In constitutional theory the convention of individual ministerial responsibility ensures the accountability of ministers to Parliament. In practice it is frequently used by government to limit rather than facilitate accountability. In this book Diana Woodhouse examines the divergence betweentheory and practice.She analyses the situations in which ministers resign, the effectivness of resignation as a means of accountability, and the abdication by ministers of responsibility. She also examines the powers and limitations of Select Committees, the effect of the new Next Steps Agencies on individualministerial responsibility, and draws comparisons with mechanisms of accountability adopted by other countries operating under the Westminster system of government.The inclusion of detailed case studies of the resignations, actual and threatened, of Lord Carrington, Leon Brittan, Edwina Currie, David Mellor, James Prior, and Kenneth Baker make this book especially pertinent to our understanding of the current political scene and to recent institutional changeswithin Parliament and government. By highlighting the present deficiencies and possible future failing in public accountability Dr Woodhouse's study provides an essential complement to recent debates about constitutional reform.

"Canada's prime minister is a dictator." "The Sun King of Canadian government." "More powerful than any other chief executive of any other democratic country." These kinds of claims are frequently made about Canada's leader – especially when the prime minister's party holds a majority government in Parliament. But is there any truth to these arguments? At the Centre of Government not only presents a comprehensively researched work on the structure of political power in Canada but also offers a first-hand view of the inner workings of the Canadian federal government. Ian Brodie – former chief of staff to Prime Minister Stephen Harper and former executive director of the Conservative Party of Canada – argues that the various workings of the Prime Minister's Office, the Privy Council Office, the cabinet, parliamentary committees, and the role of backbench members of Parliament undermine propositions that the prime minister has evolved into the role of an autocrat, with unchecked control over the levers of political power. He corrects the dominant thinking that Canadian prime ministers hold power without limits over their party, caucus, cabinet, Parliament, the public service, and the policy agenda. Citing examples from his time in government and from Canadian political history he argues that in Canada's evolving political system, with its roots in the pre-Confederation era, there are effective checks on executive power, and that the golden age of Parliament and the backbencher is likely now. Drawing on a vast body of work on governance and the role of the executive branch of government, At the Centre of Government is a fact-based primer on the workings of Canadian government and sobering second thoughts about many proposals for reform.

The extension to other Realms of the reserve power to refuse a dissolution