This book examines existing mineral fiscal policies covering income taxation, royalties, free carried and participative (community and government) interests and also highlights the impacts of these policies on the feasibility of mineral projects as well as on revenue and other benefits to the State. While publications already exist on the subject matter, they have invariably approached the topic primarily from a Government standpoint rather than the mining industry. This book aims to provide a balance in this debate by comparing the financial outcomes gained or foregone by both Government and industry under different policy regimes. The discussions are supported by quantitative examples to more clearly articulate the potential outcomes and better inform future fiscal policy decisions.

Oil, gas and mineral deposits are a substantial part of the wealth of many countries, not least in developing and emerging market economies. Harnessing some part of that wealth for fiscal purposes is critical for economic development: in few areas of economic life are the returns to good policy so large, or mistakes so costly.

Mali’s gold sector is an enclave with weak forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy. Given the predominance of the fiscal transmission channel, it is important that the design of the mineral tax regime gives the state a fair share of the benefits. Using optimal control theory, this paper estimates that the optimal royalty tax in Mali is about 3.5 percent. By reducing the royalty rate from 6 percent to 3 percent, Mali’s mining code broadly ensures that the risk is shared between the state and mining companies, provides sufficient incentives to attract new exploration, and is comparable to the fiscal regimes in other sub-Saharan African countries in its mix of tax instruments and tax structure.