"Fascinating case studies and findings of scientists...who study Theory of mind, and offer compelling insights on the human condition.--Jacket.

A comprehensive examination of a hotly debated question proposes a new model for mindreading in animals and a new experimental approach. Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? In Mindreading Animals, Robert Lurz offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals. Some empirical researchers and philosophers claim that some animals are capable of anticipating other creatures' behaviors by interpreting observable cues as signs of underlying mental states; others claim that animals are merely clever behavior-readers, capable of using such cues to anticipate others' behaviors without interpreting them as evidence of underlying mental states. Lurz argues that neither position is compelling and proposes a way to move the debate, and the field, forward. Lurz offers a bottom-up model of mental-state attribution that is built on cognitive abilities that animals are known to possess rather than on a preconceived view of the mind applicable to mindreading abilities in humans. Lurz goes on to describe an innovative series of new experimental protocols for animal mindreading research that show in detail how various types of animals—from apes to monkeys to ravens to dogs—can be tested for perceptual state and belief attribution.

Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? In Mindreading Animals, Robert Lurz offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals. Some empirical researchers and philosophers claim that some animals are capable of anticipating other creatures' behaviors by interpreting observable cues as signs of underlying mental states; others claim that animals are merely clever behavior-readers, capable of using such cues to anticipate others' behaviors without interpreting them as evidence of underlying mental states. Lurz argues that neither position is compelling and proposes a way to move the debate, and the field, forward. Lurz offers a bottom-up model of mental-state attribution that is built on cognitive abilities that animals are known to possess rather than on a preconceived view of the mind applicable to mindreading abilities in humans. Lurz goes on to describe an innovative series of new experimental protocols for animal mindreading research that show in detail how various types of animals -- from apes to monkeys to ravens to dogs -- can be tested for perceptual state and belief attribution.

The cognitive ability to think about other people's psychological states is known as `mindreading'. This Element critiques assumptions that have been formative in shaping philosophical theories of mindreading: that mindreading is ubiquitous, underpinning the vast majority of our social interactions; and that its primary goal is to provide predictions and explanations of other people's behaviour. It begins with an overview of key positions and empirical literature in the debate. It then introduces and motivates the pluralist turn in this literature, which challenges the core assumptions of the traditional views. The second part of the Element uses case studies to further motivate the pluralist framework, and to advocate the pluralist approach as the best way to progress our understanding of social cognitive phenomena.

Gain a hidden edge using your natural mind-reading abilities It sounds incredible, but you actually read people’s minds all the time—you just don’t realize it. Join renowned author Richard Webster as he shows you how to take control of this innate skill by determining your own dominant sense, reading other people’s energy, deciphering non-verbal messages, and discreetly influencing others with your thoughts. Providing easy experiments and exercises, Mind Reading Quick & Easy helps develop and refine your abilities at both a beginner and advanced level. This remarkable book also shows how to develop skills for mind reading using the phone and e-mail, dream telepathy, and mental communication with pets. By enhancing your mind-to-mind connection with others and interpreting body language cues, you’ll perceive more than you ever thought possible.

Cognition, Mindreading, and Shakespeare's Characters brings cognitive science to Shakespeare, applying contemporary theories of mindreading to Shakespeare’s construction of character. Building on the work of the philosopher Alvin Goldman and cognitive literary critics such as Bruce McConachie and Lisa Zunshine, Nicholas Helms uses the language of mindreading to analyze inference and imagination throughout Shakespeare’s plays, dwelling at length on misread minds in King Lear, Much Ado About Nothing, Othello, and Romeo and Juliet. Shakespeare manipulates the mechanics of misreading to cultivate an early modern audience of adept mindreaders, an audience that continues to contemplate the moral ramifications of Shakespeare’s characters even after leaving the playhouse. Using this cognitive literary approach, Helms reveals how misreading fuels Shakespeare’s enduring popular appeal and investigates the ways in which Shakespeare’s characters can both corroborate and challenge contemporary cognitive theories of the human mind.

Based on 15 years of original research, psychologist Ickes examines "empathic accuracy"--the mind's potential to intuit what other people are thinking and feeling.